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JUNK JUSTICE: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF 4,400 LAWSUITS FILED
BY DEBT BUYERS
Peter A. Holland ∗
Abstract: Debt buyers have flooded courts nationwide with collection lawsuits against consumers. This article reports the findings from the broadest in-depth study of debt buyer litigation
outcomes yet undertaken. The study demonstrates that in debt
buyer cases, (1) the vast majority of consumers lose the vast majority of cases by default the vast majority of the time; (2) consumers had no lawyer in ninety-eight percent of the cases; and (3)
those who filed a notice that they intended to defend themselves
without an attorney fared poorly, both in court and in out of
court settlements.
This study challenges the notion that there is an “adversary system” within the context of debt buyer lawsuits. The findings suggest that no such adversary system exists for most defendants in consumer debt cases. Instead, these cases exist in a
“shadow system” with little judicial oversight, which results in
mass produced default judgments.
The procedural and substantive due process problems
which are endemic in debt buyer cases call for heightened awareness and remedial action by the bench, the bar, and the academy.
As lawyers who are “public citizens, with a special responsibility
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for the quality of justice,” 1 the profession can do better. This article proposes suggestions for further study, and several common
sense reforms.

1

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011).
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“We’re watching a fight between two players, one a
skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into the
ring for the first time and gets clubbed over the head before they even get a sense of what the rules are.”
- Elizabeth Warren, 2006. 2

INTRODUCTION

T

his paper examines the litigation outcomes achieved by a
specific type of plaintiff: entities that purchase defaulted
consumer debt from banks for pennies on the dollar, and then file
lawsuits against millions of consumers for the full face value of
the debt. Banks sell this junk debt after they charge it off pursuant to Treasury Regulations, and then take the full face value of
the debt as a loss for tax purposes.3 Junk debt arises primarily
from credit cards and other unsecured debt. 4 It is called “junk”
not only because of its low price, but also because it is often sold
pursuant to “as is” contracts with broad disclaimers of warranty,
with little or no documentation other than an Excel spreadsheet
listing of accounts. 5
2
Michael Rezendes & Francie Latour, No Mercy for Consumers, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part1_main/
(quoting Elizabeth Warren).
3
This “loss” is comprised not only of principal loaned, but also of all accrued interest, late fees, over-limit fees, and whatever other discretionary fees
may have been added, all of which serve to increase the amount of the loss for
tax purposes. The Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy requires the bank to charge-off an account 180 days after delinquency. Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36903 (June 12, 2000), available at http://1.usa.gov/GTwzVz.
See also Internal Revenue Code, Bad Debts, 26 U.S.C. § 166 (2012) (providing
deduction for worthless debt); 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-2(d) (2012) (evidence of worthlessness of debt as applied to banks); Rev. Rul. 2001-59,
http://1.usa.gov/GU4UGw.
4
Increasingly banks are starting to sell, and junk debt investors are starting to purchase deficiencies from secured consumer debt, such as car loans,
and foreclosure deficiencies. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
5
According to a January, 2013 study by the Federal Trade Commission of
over 5,000 portfolios of sale, four cents on the dollar is the national average,
spanning the time frame between March and August of 2009. U.S. FEDERAL
TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING
INDUSTRY ii (2013) [hereinafter STRUCTURE & PRACTICES], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf. Structure & Practices is
the first major study of the inner workings of the debt buying industry, however it provides no data on the litigation behavior or success of debt buyers, a
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Lawsuits filed by junk debt buyers expose a business
model that is, literally, the buying and selling of claims to be utilized in litigation for profit. 6 Short of voluntary payment, the
primary goal of debt-buyer lawsuits is to turn unsecured debt into
court judgments, fully secured and fully collectable through garnishment and other enforcement proceedings. As is pointed out in
the Federal Trade Commission’s 2009 report titled Broken System and elsewhere, in their rush to secure judgment, debt buyers
often mislead consumers and courts.7
There is a widespread belief that in our broken system,
small claims courts have become an extension of the debt collection industry. There are anecdotal reports that more than 95% of
all collection cases end in a judgment in favor of the collector. 8 At
subject which is left to this and other studies.
6
Assume the following scenario which, for the sake of simplicity of illustration, will use simple, rather than compound interest: on December 31, a
consumer owes $1,000 on her credit card, all of which is principal and does not
include any interest, late fees or other fees. She fails to pay her credit card bill,
and never makes another payment. What happens? On February 1, she will
receive a bill for the $1,000, plus 29.99% interest based on the annual percentage rate, plus a late fee for $39. She will continue to receive these charges for
the next 5 months (for a total of 6 months, or 180 days until the creditor will
“charge off” the account for tax purposes). By this time, the bill will be approximately $1,394, or almost 40% higher than it was on the day that she defaulted.
This $1,000 loan, which now includes an extra $400 tacked on since the day
the consumer stopped paying, will be sold for $56 (assuming a sales price of 4
cents on the dollar), and the consumer will then be sued by a debt buyer for
$1,400, plus attorneys’ fees of 15%, or $210. (This assumes they will not also be
seeking prejudgment interest of 29.99%). For the consumer, the price of defaulting has suddenly become 161% of the principal of the amount loaned. For
the debt buyer who invested $56, the potential return on investment is 2,800%;
$56 invested and $1,610 returned.
7
Regulate Junk Debt, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Dec 18, 2011,
http://www.fredericknewspost.com/archive/article_071a18fb-1f4c-5687-9899faafbcf30d9b.html (“Part of the confusion arising from this shady practice
among consumers is whether the calls they receive are to collect legitimate
debt, or whether they are being taken for a ride . . . A frightening angle to this
is that junk debt purchasers can sue the alleged debtor based on little but a
supporting affidavit.”).
8
See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 7, n. 18 (2010)
[hereinafter
BROKEN
SYSTEM],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf;
Jessica
SilverGreenberg, Lender Drops Pursuit of Debt, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2011, at C1
(“Roughly 94% of collection cases filed against borrowers result in default
judgment in favor of the lender, according to industry estimates.”).
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least one judge who handles debt buyer and collections cases reports that in over 90% of all such collection cases filed, the creditor lacks the requisite proof to prevail. 9 Instead of proof, arguably
creditors rely on a de facto system of “default judgment justice”
wherein the creditors know that very few defendants will ever
challenge the lawsuit, and overwhelmed courts and judges will
simply enter default judgments in order to keep the flood of paperwork from bringing the workflow to a halt.
There is a developing literature which examines the multitude of doctrinal and due process concerns that arise from this
system of “default judgment justice.” 10 The Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),
the National Consumer Law Center, and many others have published important studies, 11 and academics have demonstrated relatively recent but growing interest. 12
In separate studies of Texas and Indiana, Mary Spector
and Judith Fox have done groundbreaking small-scale empirical
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Problems Riddle Moves to Collect Credit Card
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A1 (“‘I would say that roughly 90 percent
of the credit card lawsuits are flawed and can’t prove the person owes the
debt’ said Noach Dear, a civil court judge in Brooklyn . . . .”). See also William
Glaberson, In New York, Some Judges Now Skeptical About Debt Collectors’
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A15.
10
See, e.g., RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS
CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/debt-machine.pdf (“In pursuit of
judgments, creditors and collectors have swamped small claims and other state
courts with a torrent of lawsuits.”); BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8;
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5.
11
See sources cited supra note 10.
12
See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355
(2011); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 2007 DEM. J. 8, 10 (2007) (“Anxiety and shame have become constant companions for Americans struggling
with debt. Since 2000, families have filed nearly 10 million petitions for bankruptcy. Today about one in every seven families in America is dealing with a
debt collector.”); Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 175
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 160 (2008) (noting the widespread negative effects of consumer debts and that “[n]ot even death will insulate families from the sting of
aggressive debt collectors. Sears, for example, had a special team to collect
from bereaved families when a customer died still owing a credit balance—
even though the family had no legal obligation to pay these debts.”); Young
Walgenkim, Killing “Zombie Debt” Through Clarity and Consistency in the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 65 (2011).
9
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quantitative and qualitative analyses of state court filings in these
cases. 13 The National Center for State Courts has done a rough
categorization of “contract” cases filed, most of which are collection cases. 14 Important new analyses, notably by Dalié Jiménez,
are emerging of the “as is” sales and purchase contracts which exist between original creditors and debt buyers, and between initial and subsequent purchasers. 15 Regulatory actions, notably by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), have resulted in settlements, including one where JP Morgan Chase “neither admits nor denies” that in its collection litigation it filed false
affidavits, filed false documents that resulted in financial errors
in favor of the bank, and failed to have in place processes and
systems to ensure the accuracy and integrity of accounts sold to
debt buyers. 16 In light of the flood of lawsuits, the anecdotal reports regarding the high rates of default, and the findings of the
regulators regarding widespread abuse, it is appropriate to do a
broad scale statistical analysis of court filings and litigation outcomes.
This paper analyzes 4,400 cases filed in Maryland collection courts by eleven separate debt buyers, each of whom filed
more than 1,000 cases per year during the 2009-2010 two year
sample period. 17 The subject debt buyers were selected because
See discussion infra Part I.E.
See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010
STATE
COURT
CASELOADS
11
(2012),
available
at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/otherpages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx.
The author has spoken with a researcher at NCSC to confirm this.
15
Dalié Jiménez, Illegality in the Sale and Collection of Consumer Debts,
(December
5,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250784.
16
Consent Order at Art. I, ¶ 2, Art. IV, ¶ 1(p), JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 2013-138 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of
the
Treasury
Sept.
18,
2013),
available
at
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf.
17
The debt buyers were:
Legal Name
Name Used in Case Search
Pasadena Receivables, Inc.
Pasadena
Midland Funding LLC aka Midland Midland
Credit Management
Arrow Financial Services, LLC
Arrow
LVNV Funding, LLC
LVNV
Asset Acceptance, LLC
Asset
13
14
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they filed a large number of cases and, at the time they were selected, they comprised a representative sample of large publicly
traded national corporate plaintiffs as well as small closely held
regional and local corporate plaintiffs. 18 In order to capture the
largest percentage of cases that had reached a judgment, dismissal or other final disposition as of the cutoff date for gathering the
data, 19 the data sample is comprised of cases that were filed by
the subject debt buyers between January 1, 2009 and December
31, 2010. 20
This study uses a larger statistical sample with more metrics and more analysis than is available in prior studies. In contrast to the two principal recent statistical studies of debt buyers, 21 this study is not confined to a single court or county forum.
Rather, the cases in this study’s sample were drawn from a pool
of all 26 District Court jurisdictions in the state. 22
The empirical findings of this study confirm the widespread belief that in litigation, debt buyers employ a high volume
default judgment business model, and that their legal pleadings,
evidence and tactics are rarely exposed to the adversary process.
Principal findings of this study include: (1) about 1 in 4 cases filed
were dismissed by the court because the summons was never
served on the defendant; (2) less than 2 in 10 defendants who
were served with a summons filed a response (known in Maryland as a “Notice of Intention to Defend”); (3) in almost 7 out of
10 cases, debt buyers obtained judgments against defendants in
Portfolio Recovery Associates
Cavalry Portfolio Services LLC
Fradkin & Weber, PA
Advantage Assets II, INC
North Star Capital Acquisition
Atlantic Credit & Finance, INC
18

Portfolio
Cavalry
Fradkin
Advantage
North Star
Atlantic

There has since been some consolidation in the industry. See infra note

115.
Cutoff date was March 31, 2012.
Of the 4,400 cases sampled, as of the March 31, 2012 cutoff date, all but
381 cases (8.65%) had reached final disposition through a money judgment,
bankruptcy, dismissal or settlement.
21
See discussion of Spector and Fox studies infra Part I.E.
22
Maryland has 26 counties. The District Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over small claims ($5,000 or less), and concurrent jurisdiction with
the Circuit Court on claims over $5,000 up to $30,000. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401, 3-405 (West 2011).
19
20
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an average amount of more than $3,000; (4) the vast majority of
cases do not result in a voluntary settlement; (5) more than 99%
of the judgments against defendants were obtained without a trial; (6) fewer than 2% of defendants were represented by a lawyer,
and those who did have a lawyer achieved far better outcomes
than those who did not have a lawyer; and (7) based on the 2010
census data, there appears to be a disparate impact on racial minorities.
The data and analysis of this study has important implications for advocates, judges, litigants, legislators, regulators, policy
makers and academics.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I describes the
nature of the debt buying and debt collection industry, and surveys the existing literature on lawsuits filed by debt buyers. Part
II describes the methodology of the study and reports its results.
Part III contains my analysis and draws conclusions. Part IV contains my recommendations for further study and action.

I. THE DEBT INDUSTRY AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
A. Debt Collectors
Debt collection cases have concerned scholars and policy
makers for decades. In 1974, David Caplovitz published Consumers in Trouble, which constituted the first broad empirical
study of consumers facing debt collection in the United States. 23
In his Foreword to the Caplovitz study, United States Senator
William Proxmire concluded that when it comes to collection of
consumer debt, “[o]ur legal system benefits the unscrupulous and
penalizes the weak.” 24 Many of Caplovitz’s findings from more
than forty years ago still apply to today’s “consumers in trouble.”
Caplovitz found that consumers who default on financial obligations are rarely the “deadbeats” of popular myth, a fact which
remains true today, and which even the collection industry ad-

DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS
DEFAULT xii (1974). Caplovitz wrote about law suits filed by original creditors; not the debt buyers of this study, because debt buyers did not exist in
1974. His study was comprised largely of in-person interviews of debtors. He
found that in many cases, these consumers had valid defenses to the lawsuits.
24
Id.
23

IN
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mits. 25 He also found that the people most likely to be in trouble
were the poor, 26 and that consumers usually get into trouble due
to circumstances beyond their control. 27 Caplovitz concluded that
when they do get into trouble, consumers face a debt collection
court system that is unfair to them. 28 It is notable that the
Caplovitz study was published in 1974, three years before the
passage of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was designed to correct collection abuses.29
When it comes to the perceived fundamental unfairness of
the debt collection system, little has changed in the intervening
years. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission concluded that in
today’s collection system, “neither litigation nor arbitration currently provides adequate protection for consumers. The system
for resolving disputes about consumer debts is broken.” 30 Some of
the hallmarks of this broken system include lack of data integrity,
lack of proof, inadequate documentation, robo-signing and other
unfair and deceptive acts and practices. 31 Judges, advocates, academics, federal regulators, 32 state regulators, 33 Congress, 34 and the
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at x (Foreword by William Proxmire); Mike
Bevel, You’re Doing it Wrong: Misrepresenting the Collection Industry,
INSIDEARM, April 29, 2011, http://www.insidearm.com/opinion/youre-doingit-wrong-misrepresenting-the-collection-industry/ (“At no point would a reputable collection agency doing its job correctly ever refer to a consumer as a
deadbeat.”).
26
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 4.
27
48% of consumers were in trouble because of a loss of income and 11%
due to unexpected increases in their expenses, such as medical bills. Id. at 53.
Only 5% were what Caplovitz regarded as the stereotype of “deadbeat” debtors. Id. at 54.
28
Id. at 291-301.
29
Sen. Proxmire, who wrote the foreword to Consumers in Trouble, was
also chair of the Senate Banking Committee during the passage of the FDCPA.
30
BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8, at i.
31
“Robo-signing” can include signing affidavits which falsely claim to be
based on personal knowledge, and having third parties sign affidavits in the
name of the alleged affiant. The later practice was recently condemned by
Maryland’s Court of Appeals. Atty. Griev. Comm’n. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178
(Md. 2013).
32
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
ACT ANNUAL REPORT (2013). The FTC and CFPB jointly held a roundtable
on debt collection in mid-2013. See Life of a Debt: Data Integrity in Debt Collection, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Life of a Debt],
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/06/life-debt-dataintegrity-debt-collection. Since the passage of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Federal Trade Commission has been responsible for consumer pro25
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tection in debt collection. The Dodd-Frank Act shifted much of that responsibility from the FTC to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The CFPB now shares overall enforcement responsibility with the FTC
and other agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Communications Commission. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 11-203, §1089, 124 Stat. 1376, 2092-93
(2010) (amending the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1692 et
seq.). The CFPB can prescribe rules regarding debt collection, issue guidance,
collect data, undertake research and conduct educational campaigns. In particular, the CFPB has the power to regulate large non-bank actors on consumer financial services including debt collection, and has recently begun to use
that authority. It is anticipated that the CFPB will promulgate new rules on
debt buying in the near future.
33
Maryland has been a particularly active regulator in this field. For example, the following enforcement actions were undertaken in the last few
years, contributing to the staying or dismissal of tens of thousands of debt buyer lawsuits: Summary Order to Cease and Desist, Portfolio Recovery Group,
No. CFR-FY2012-074 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Apr. 9,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/portfoliorecc&d.pdf; Settlement Agreement and Consent Order at 5-6, Credit Service, LLC, No. CFRFY2012-077 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Oct. 14, 2011), available
at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/creditservicessettlement.pd
f (“Filing actions . . . intended to obtain judgment on affidavit . . . but which
contained affidavits that were based . . . on the affiant’s knowledge, information and belief, a standard insufficient to obtain such judgments . . .
[c]laiming and receiving unauthorized attorney’s fees . . . [c]laiming and receiving prejudgment interest that included compound interest and misrepresenting
the correct amount of principal and interest in the documents filed . . . [f]iling
complaints alleging ownership of particular consumer claims but which complaints contained invalid or deficient assignment documents . . . filing complaints beyond the 3-year statute of limitations . . . [m]ailing collection letters to
consumers threatening to file lawsuits based on consumer claims that were already beyond the 3-year statute of limitations”); Settlement Agreement and
Consent Order at 4-5, Sunshine Financial Group, LLC, Nos. CFR-FY2011135 & CFR-FY2012-019 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Sept. 9,
2011),
available
at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/sunshinesettlement.pdf;
Settlement Agreement at 4, Worldwide Asset Management et al., No. DFRFY2010-221 (Md. State Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Aug. 10, 2010), available
at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/worldwidesettlement.pdf
(“[A] debt collector . . . may not ‘[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right
with knowledge that the right does not exist.’ . . . [t]he Agency has reasonable
grounds to believe that respondents engaged in unlicensed collection agency
activities and that all Respondents engaged in other violations . . . referenced
above.”). See also Press Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judiciary, Thousands of District Court of Maryland Cases Dismissed (Mar. 17,
2011),
available
at
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media have broadly exposed these and other problems unique to
debt collection. 35
http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2011/pr20110317.html (announcing
the dismissal of 10,168 Midland Funding cases filed between January 15 2007January 15, 2010 and noting also that 27,000 Mann Bracken cases were dismissed in 2010); Press Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judiciary, District Court of Maryland Dismisses Sunshine Financial Group Debt
Collection
Cases
(Sept.
21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2011/pr20110921.html (announcing
that 314 cases were dismissed and 323 reduced to remove atty’s fees.); Press
Release, Office of Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Md. Judiciary, District Court of
Maryland Dismisses Thousands More Debt Collection Cases (Oct. 11, 2012),
available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/media/news/2012/pr20121011.html.
34
Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Following Call to Rein in Debt Collection Industry, Brown Holds Hearing on Efforts to End Consumer Abuses
(July
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/following-call-to-reinin-debt-collection-industry-brown-holds-hearing-on-efforts-to-end-consumerabuses (“Former bank employees have reported that they were instructed to
‘[g]o ahead and sign’ affidavits verifying consumer debts, even when they
didn’t have documentation . . . [w]hen debt buyers purchase these loans from
the biggest banks, they sign ‘as is’ contracts, giving banks cover to offload
debts for collection that may be inaccurate, incomplete, or legally uncollectable.” (quoting Sen. Sherrod Brown)).
35
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, In Civil Court, Reckoning Awaits Those Who Got
Seduced by Plastic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A19; Jeff Horwitz, It’s Robo
Redux: Card Lawsuits Stalk Banks, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 2012, at 1. The Boston Globe published a very important series of articles in 2006, which paved
the way for other reporters. See Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (mentioning
the activities of the Goldstone brothers – Mass. Debt buyer) (“[A]lmost unnoticed by policy-makers, many millions of Americans have slid, or been pushed,
into a debtor’s hell[.]”) (Quoting Elizabeth Warren, “We’re watching a fight
between two players, one a skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into
the ring for the first time and gets clubbed over the head before they even get a
sense of what the rules are.”); Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
July
31,
2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part2_main/ (“The ‘people’s court’
has become the collectors’ court . . . [i]t is a de facto arm of a fast-growing and
aggressive industry that has swamped court dockets with lawsuits[.]”) (recounting the case of a Judge Barrett, who ordered a defendant to surrender her
jewelry or be imprisoned) (“Often, debtors are treated with less courtesy than
the accused felons in the criminal court across the hall, and their rights are less
respected.”); Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Enforcers’ Might Goes
Unchecked,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
Aug.
1,
2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part3_main/ (describing the abuses
of Boston “Constables” publicly appointed collectors); Walter V. Robinson &
Beth Healy, Regulators, Policy Makers Seldom Intervene, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/part4_main/ (quoting
Donald Friedman of debt buyer Liberty Point Corp. “[debt buying] is one of
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Nowhere is the breakdown in the collections system more
evident than in the context of lawsuits filed by junk debt buyers.
Junk debt buyers are even further removed from personal relationships with consumers than the commercial lenders in the
Caplovitz study. It is therefore unsurprising that these investors
in junk debt would resort to “bureaucratic procedures to collect
debts,” a trend that has made debt collection the most complained
about business under the Federal Trade Commission’s jurisdiction. 36
B. Debt Buying 37
The highly successful debt buyer business model is simple
to describe. First, buy debts for pennies on the dollar;38 second,
clog the courts with small claims lawsuits; third, rely on the fact
that defendants are not likely to contest the cases or show up in
courts; and finally, bank on the fact that small claims court judges often do not enforce basic rules of evidence or procedure in uncontested cases.
Over the past two decades, the seemingly easy money to
be made from investing in and pursuing junk debt has caused the

the sexiest, one of the most financially lucrative businesses you can get into.”)
(“[I]n spite of all this, there is an eerie silence among regulators, policy makers,
and legislators.”).
36
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at i.
37
This section contains a brief overview of the junk debt buyer industry.
For a more detailed overview, see CLAUDIA WILNER & NASOAN SHEFTELGOMES, LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS
ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/DEBT_DECEPTION_FINAL_
WEB.pdf; RACHEL TERP & LAUREN BOWNE, EAST BAY CMTY. LAW CTR. &
CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES AND THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY NEED REFORM NOW (2001),
available at http://www.ebclc.org/documents/Past_Due_Report_2011.pdf;
JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 10; Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion
Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in
Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259 (2011).
38
The FTC found that the range for non-mortgage debt examined in their
study was between 1.5 and 6.6 cents on the dollar for charged-off portfolios.
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at D-6. The average across all debt
buyer activity was about 4 cents on the dollar. Id. at ii. In fact, some debt sells
for less than one penny on the dollar.
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industry to explode 39 to the point where today the face value of
purchased credit card debt exceeds $100 billion annually.40 The
explosive growth of this industry has created an array of challenges to the courts, to the consumer defendants, and to notions of
constitutional due process. One of the most basic challenges is the
fact that consumers do not recognize the name of the debt buyer
plaintiff, or the amount being sued on. This adds to the exceedingly high rate of default judgments. 41
The confusion that results from the buying and selling of legal claims was observed by Lord Coke almost 500 years ago
when he described:
[T]he great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders
of our law, who have provided, that no possibility, right,
title, nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to
strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying
of contentions and suits, of great oppression of the people. 42
Lord Coke’s observation foreshadowed what Caplovitz
eventually concluded:
[T]he breakdown in credit transactions that results in
lawsuits is . . . very much a product of the anonymity of
consumer transactions in urban America. It is this lack
39
Modern day debt buying is often said to have originated with the sale of
debts by the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation in the wake of the
savings and loan crisis. Robert M. Hunt, Collecting Consumer Debt in America,
BUS.
REV.,
Q2
2007,
at
11,
available
at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/businessreview/2007/q2/hunt_collecting-consumer-debt.pdf;
STRUCTURE
&
PRACTICES, supra note 5 at 17. The debt buying market is now dominated by
large participants. Id. at i (the nine largest debt buyers held over 75% of debts
sold in 2008); Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection
Market, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,775 (Oct. 31, 2012) (amending 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090 to
define larger participants in the consumer debt collection industry, including
debt buyers).
40
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom –
In Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (“More than 450 debt buyers
scooped up an estimated $100 billion in distressed loans last year, according to
the latest estimates by Kaulkin Ginsburg, a debt-collection industry adviser.”);
The FTC’s report utilized data on debt portfolios worth $143 billion, bought
by the 9 largest debt buyers. STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 8.
41
See Life of A Debt, supra note 32.
42
Lampet’s Case, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B.) 997 (emphasis added).
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of knowledge of each other by the parties to these transactions that contributes to mistrust, misinterpretations
of the reasons for the default, and the employment of
harsh, bureaucratic procedures to collect debts. In this
respect we are dealing . . . with an urban problem in
which trust, based on personal relationships, is absent. 43
Today’s debt buyer lawsuits involve the purchase, sale,
and suing upon old, unreliable, inaccurate documentation of
abandoned consumer credit accounts, consisting primarily of
lending products such as subprime credit cards with (what used
to be) usurious interest rates, 44 accumulated late fees, over limit
fees, and monthly usage fees. Debt buyers pay pennies on the
dollar for accounts abandoned by the original creditor, sold “as is”
with little or no documentation, and lots of disclaimers of warranty. 45
Junk debt investors purchase consumer debt from large
financial institutions in portfolios, containing thousands of individual debts. Although the cases in this study are comprised primarily of credit card debt, it is important to note that all kinds of
consumer debt is being bought and sold today, including mortgage foreclosure deficiencies. 46 Scholars have documented some
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 9.
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a national bank may export
the home state’s interest rate, regardless of state usury caps. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation, 439 U.S.
299, 308, n.24 (1978).
45
Typical disclaimers of warranty include that the account may already
be satisfied, that the debtor may have prevailed at trial, that the debtor was
the victim of identity theft, that the debtor declared bankruptcy, that the account is beyond the statute of limitations, that the debtor is dead, that the
amount of the alleged debt is only approximate, and that documentation may
not exist. See, e.g., Loan Sale Agreement By and Among FIA Card Services,
N.A. and CACH, LLC (Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Loan Sale Agreement],
available
at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/329733/fia-tocach-forward-flow.pdf. See also Jiménez, supra note 15.
46
Debt buyer interest in foreclosure deficiency judgments has been known
since at least 2011. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, The House Is Gone But The Debt
Lives
On,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Oct
1,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405311190406060457657253202
9526792 (“The increase in deficiency judgments has sparked a growing secondary market. Sophisticated investors are ‘ravenous for this debt and ramping up their purchases[.]”). See also Douglas French, The New Deficiency Market, MISES ECON. BLOG, (Oct 4, 2011), http://archive.mises.org/18607/the-new43
44
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of the problems inherent in this business model. 47 More recently,
regulators and mainstream media have expressed concern regarding the “as is” terms, without representations or warranties, on
which these debts are purchased. The FTC and the OCC in particular have questioned the adequacy of the information debt
buyers receive with purchased debts. 48 The FTC’s Structure and
Practices study revealed that debt sale and purchase agreements
between the creditor and the debt buyers generally limit the
availability of key documents, such as account statements and
credit agreements. 49 Further, the debt sale agreements often disclaim the accuracy of the information provided and explicitly disclaim warranties of title, validity, enforceability, collectability,
and accuracy. 50 In 2009, the FTC found that information provided to debt buyers was “so deficient that collectors [sought] paydeficiency-market/. This trend only seems likely to increase, as suits on deficiency judgments generally rise. See Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners Years After Foreclosure, WASH. POST, June 15,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/lenders-seek-courtactions-against-homeowners-years-after-foreclosure/2013/06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html.
47
Lauren Goldberg, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (2005) (an early report on abusive
collection by debt buyers); Holland, supra note 37 (reporting abuses in the
small claims jurisdiction in Maryland); Sam Glover, Has the Flood of Debt
Collection Lawsuits Swept Away Minnesotans’ Due Process Rights, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1115 (2008) (reporting the “flood” of collection suits and
consequent abuses in Minnesota); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumer From
Zombie-Debt Collectors, NEW MEXICO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350555. An additional important aspect of the
problem, not treated in this article, is the negative impact on the creditworthiness of debtors who fall victim to abusive collection practices. See Mary Spector, Where the FCRA Meets the FDCPA: The Impact of Unfair Collection
Practices on the Credit Report, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 479 (2013).
48
STRUCTURE & PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 35-36.
49
Id.
50
Jiménez, supra note 15, at 4. Note however that representatives of the
debt collection industry deny that this is current practice. See Life of a Debt,
supra note 32; Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013)
[hereinafter
Statement
of
Corey
Stone],
available
at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&Fil
eStore_id=293a7183-c6c6-4753-97a6-a44c859dc093 (testimony of Corey Stone,
Assistant Director, Office of Deposits, Cash, Collections, and Reporting Markets of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). These denials are difficult
to verify, because debt buyers usually refuse to produce the contracts.
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ment from the wrong consumer or demand[ed] the wrong
amount.” 51
The lack of proof, disclaimers of warranty and unreliable
record keeping have led to significant criticism and threats of
regulatory action to strengthen supervision of the debt buying
business.52 This criticism and the threat of regulatory intervention
have already led one major bank to cease its sale of defaulted
consumer debt altogether. 53 Despite these problems, the debt buying industry remains strong and has even begun to expand internationally, with industry leader Encore Capital recently acquiring the English debt buyer Cabot Financial.54
C. Debt Buyer Collection Litigation
The debt buying business model has been to flood the
courts across the country, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of default judgments entered against consumers.
Maryland provides a good example of how this business
model has affected some courts. In two of Maryland’s largest jurisdictions, consumers sued by debt buyers for only a few hundred or a few thousand dollars are summoned to appear in a
courtroom in order to engage in “resolutions conferences” with
sophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyers. 55 These meetings occur inside of
51
FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTION CONSUMER DEBTS: THE
CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 22 (2009).
52
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
53
Maria Aspan & Jeff Horwitz, Chase Halts Card Debt Sales Ahead of
Crackdown,
AM.
BANKER,
Jul
1,
2013,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_126/chase-halts-card-debt-salesahead-of-crackdown-1060326-1.html.
54
Saabira Chaudhuri, Encore Capital Buys Majority Stake in Cabot
Credit
For
$192
Million,
WALL ST. J.,
May
30,
2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130530-704282.html.
55
Maria Aspan, Courthouse ‘Rocket Dockets’ Give Debt Collectors Edge
Over
Debtors,
AM.
BANKER,
Feb.
11,
2013,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_29/courthouse-rocket-docketsgive-debt-collectors-edge-over-debtors-1065545-1.html (describing the “resolution conferences”). It is notable that the American Banker article comes more
than four years after Baltimore Sun editorial called for an end to these “rocket
dockets,” noting that “The docket has offered few or no safeguards for defendants and carried the imprimatur of the judicial system . . . .” Editorial, Reform
‘Rocket
Docket’,
BALTIMORE
SUN,
Jan.
27,
2009,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-01-27/news/0901260050_1_district-courtdocket-maryland-hospitals.
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courtrooms in which no judge is present to oversee the proceedings. 56 If the consumer fails to appear, the file goes to a judge for
consideration of entry of an uncontested “affidavit judgment.” On
the other hand, if the consumer does appear and demands a trial,
there is no guarantee that a trial will be held on that date. Despite
the fact that there is no judge present, the continued existence of
these proceedings is premised on the notion that these “conferences” are a type of “pretrial conference” contemplated under the
Maryland Rules. 57
Like any other judgment creditor, once a debt buyer has
secured a judgment, it has access to a panoply of enforcement
methods. 58 The most powerful of these is a supplementary proceeding to force the judgment debtor to appear in court in order
to provide information about the debtor’s assets. 59 The debtor is
summoned to court to answer questions about their assets and income, to enable the creditor to locate assets to seize, accounts and
employers to garnish and real property on which liens can be
placed. If debtors do not appear in court, they risk being found in
contempt and arrested, a phenomenon which Lea Shepard called
“Creditor’s Contempt.” 60 In many arrest warrant cases, judges
will order that the bond which the defendant paid be released to
the judgment creditor. 61 As both Shepard and Caplovitz obAspan, supra note 55 (“What’s missing is a judge or other neutral moderator.”).
57
Id. (noting that the judges of the Maryland District Court defend the
practice and claim that it is voluntary). Although the Maryland Rules allow
“pretrial conferences” to be ordered sua sponte in the District Court, the specific Rule at issue appears to contemplate a proceeding at which a judge is present. MD. R. 3-504(a) (“The court . . . may direct all parties to appear before
it”); MD. R. 3-504(b-c)(listing administrative matters to be raised at the hearing
such as witnesses to be relied upon and amendment of pleadings, and for the
court to enter an order on such matters). In contrast, in 2008, here is how the
Baltimore Sun described the proceedings, which have changed little since then:
“Lawyers call up debtors one at a time to work out payment plans in rapid, onthe-spot settlements. Other days, lawyers haggle with debtors in the courthouse hallways. When cases go to judges, hospitals typically win after hearings
that last a few minutes or less.” Fred Schulte & James Drew, Their Day In
Court, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 2008, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/200812-22/news/0812210157_1_maryland-hospitals.
58
MD. R. 3-631.
59
Known in Maryland as “Discovery in Aid of Enforcement.” MD. R. 3633.
60
Lea K. Shepard, Creditor’s Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509 (2011).
61
Id. at 1550.
56
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served, creditor’s contempt has the effect of extending the longbanned practice of imprisonment for debt into the twenty-first
century. 62
Imprisonment for contempt arising out of small consumer
debt has attracted local and national media attention. 63 Policy
makers have begun to respond, expressing concern and launching
investigations into the practice. 64 Encore Capital disavowed arrest as a debt collection device due to negative publicity,65 and
others have criticized the tactic in the debt collection industry.66
However, the problem continues to cause concern around the
country. 67
D. The Maryland Experience
Maryland has been a leader is combating the unique problems created by debt buyer litigation, as evidenced by effective
Id. at 1543-1544; CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23.
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2011 [hereinafter Debtor’s Prison, 2011 Edition],
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870439650457620455381
1636610 (noting that more than a third of states allow arrest for debt and that
over 5,000 warrants had been issued since 2010); Alain Sherter, Jailed for $280:
The Return of Debtors’ Prisons, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012, 1:04 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-57417654/jailed-for-$280-thereturn-of-debtors-prisons/ (noting the problem and discussing the case of a
woman imprisoned for $280 alleged debt, which she did not owe, and quoting
Illinois Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan “‘Too many people have been thrown in jail
simply because they’re too poor to pay their debts.’”); Susie An, Unpaid Bills
Land Some Debtors Behind Bars, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:01
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/12/143274773/unpaid-bills-land-somedebtors-behind-bars.
64
Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edition, supra note 63 (noting the
state of Illinois and the FTC had launched investigations into the practice).
65
Id.
66
Mike Bevel, Debt Collectors (Don’t) Want to Send Debtors to Prison,
INSIDEARM.COM,
(Nov.
23,
2011,
11:48
AM),
http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-collection-news/accounts-receivablesmanagement/debt-collectors-dont-want-to-send-debtors-to-prison/ (criticizing
Silver-Greenberg and other articles reporting on the same issue, apparently on
the grounds that such arrests are not directly “because of debt”, without denying that such arrests are requested by collectors).
67
See, e.g., Martha C. White, Lenders Use a New Dirty Trick to Jail You
for
Small
Debts,
TIME,
Aug.
28,
2012,
http://business.time.com/2012/08/28/lenders-use-a-new-dirty-trick-to-jail-youfor-small-debts/.
62
63
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private class action litigation, 68 aggressive enforcement actions by
the state Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 69 and
measures taken by the Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland, who has dismissed more than 20,000 debt buyer cases since
2010. 70 Most notably, effective as of January 1, 2012, Maryland
adopted comprehensive amendments to its procedural court rules
for obtaining default judgments, also known as “affidavit judgment,” in uncontested cases in the “small claims” division of its
District Court. 71 Despite these efforts, Maryland courts remain
flooded with debt buyer lawsuits, and neither the basic business
model nor the ultimate outcome of these cases—massive default
judgments—have been altered.
E. Existing Studies of Debt Buyer Activity
One of the first reports on perceived litigation abuse by
debt buyers came in a series of Boston Globe articles in 2006. 72
The Globe reported on threats of imprisonment, 73 gross inequality
in the courtroom, 74 and shoddy evidence. 75 Although these abuses
were recognized early, they have persisted. Since 2006, debt buy68
See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. Md.
2011) (holding that “Hilco violated the [FDCPA] in filing lawsuits without a
license in violation of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act”); Hauk
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 749 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Md. 2010) (same); Finch v.
LVNV Funding, LLC, 71 A.3d 193 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (holding that
judgments obtained when the plaintiff was not a licensed debt collector are
void) cert. denied 77 A.3d 1084 (Md. 2013).
69
See, supra Note 33.
70
Id.
71
MD. R. 3-306. For text and commentary on the extensive changes, see
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE CHANGES: 171st REPORT, STANDING
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MD. CT. OF APPEALS 3147 (2011).
72
Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2; Healy, supra note 35; Robinson &
Rezendes, supra note 35; Robinson & Healy, supra note 35.
73
Healy, supra note 35 (“[S]uch threats are a common tool, both in smallclaims court and in the district court civil sessions.”).
74
See id.; Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (quoting Professor (now Senator) Elizabeth Warren, “We’re watching a fight between two players, one a
skilled repeat gladiator, and one who’s thrown into the ring for the first time
and gets clubbed over the head before they even get a sense of what the rules
are.”)
75
Rezendes & Latour, supra note 2 (recounting the case of a disabled veteran sued for debt while deployed; an affidavit filed by the plaintiff falsely
claimed he was not in the military.).
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ers have attracted increasing attention from advocates, regulators, and scholars.76 In 2009, a legal support program for municipal employees published Where’s the Proof? which is arguably
the first study devoted solely to the perceived abuses of debt buyers. 77 The report provided some of the earliest hard statistics on
debt buyer behavior, finding that less than six percent of debt
buyers were willing or able to demonstrate proper chain of title of
the debt being pursued. 78
As of mid-2014, debt buyers have begun to receive serious
regulatory scrutiny, with the CFPB’s adoption of a rule to extend
its regulatory supervision to larger participants in the debt collection industry, 79 and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s publication of its suggested “best practices” in debt sales. 80
Congress is also taking up the question of debt collection reform. 81
Supra notes 33, 47 and 55.
ROBERT MARTIN ET AL., DIST. COUNCIL 37 MUN. EMPS. LEGAL
SERVS.,
WHERE’S
THE
PROOF?
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dc37.net/benefits/health/pdf/MELS_proof.pdf.
78
Id. at 3 (noting that debt buyers responded to requests for the substantiation of debts in only 5.5% of cases).
79
Defining Larger Participants of Certain Consumer Financial Product
and Service Markets, 12 C.F.R. § 1090 (2012). See also Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Oversee Debt
Collectors
(Oct.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-to-oversee-debt-collectors/.
80
Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Protection of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (statement of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Appendix 1).
81
A hearing led by Sen. Sherrod Brown was held on the question in a
Senate subcommittee. Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Following Call to
Rein In Debt Collection Industry, Brown Holds Hearing on Efforts to End
Consumer
Abuses
(July
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/following-call-to-reinin-debt-collection-industry-brown-holds-hearing-on-efforts-to-end-consumerabuses (“Former bank employees have reported that they were instructed to
‘[g]o ahead and sign’ affidavits verifying consumer debts, even when they
didn’t have documentation . . . [w]hen debt buyers purchase these loans from
the biggest banks, they sign ‘as is’ contracts, giving banks cover to offload
debts for collection that may be inaccurate, incomplete, or legally uncollectable. . . Today I hope to hear from the FTC . . . and the CFPB about how we
can modernize debt collection oversight to better serve consumers.”). Testimony at the hearing favored improvements in the provision of information involved in debt collection. Statement of Corey Stone, supra note 50, at 3
76
77
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In 2010, a coalition of legal aid and community development organizations in New York City carried out one of the first
studies of debt-buyer cases, titled Debt Deception: How Debt
Buyers Abuse the Legal System to Prey on Lower-Income New
Yorkers. 82 The Debt Deception study used a sample of 365 court
cases, of which 336 had reached a final judgment. 83 The study
found that 81% of the cases resulted in a default judgment, and
94% of cases overall resulted in judgment for the debt buyer. 84
Not a single consumer in this study was represented by an attorney, and not a single case in this study went to trial. 85 The cases
were filed against people who lived overwhelmingly in poor and
minority neighborhoods. 86 The study also noted that out of court
settlements in court cases tended to be unsustainable payment
plans, and that in the event of default, the debt buyer would be
entitled to judgment in the full amount of the alleged debt. 87 The
report recommended increased regulation, increased judicial
scrutiny, and increased legal representation. 88
A subsequent New York study published in 2013, Debt
Collection Racket, provides insight into developments since the
Debt Deception study. 89 Using statistics from New York state
courts and the U.S. Census, Debt Collection Racket suggests that
while the overall rate of default judgments in New York state
(“[T]here is a surprising amount of consensus across all market participants –
from debt collectors, creditors, and collection attorneys, to consumer advocates, legal services providers and state attorneys general that we must develop
clear standards for data integrity and record keeping in the debt collection
market.”). See also Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Protection of the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (statement of Reilly Dolan, Acting Associate Director for the Division of Financial
Practices at the Federal Trade Commission).
82
WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37.
83
Id. at 8.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 10-12.
87
Id. at 13.
88
Id. at 16-17.
89
SUSAN SHIN & CLAUDIA WILNER, NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, THE
DEBT COLLECTION RACKET: HOW THE INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
AND PERPETUATES ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (Sarah Ludwig & Josh Zinner
eds.
2013),
available
at
http://www.nedap.org/resources/documents/DebtCollectionRacketNY.pdf.
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may have fallen (by somewhere between 38% and 62% depending on location) between 2010 and 2013, the number of consumers
represented by an attorney remains negligible at only 2%. 90
Through empirical analysis, the study also demonstrated racial
and economic disparate impact. 91 The areas most affected are
“clustered in predominantly middle-income black communities.” 92
Mary Spector’s 2011 study reported on a detailed analysis
of 507 cases filed in Dallas, Texas. 93 The cases were drawn from
the Dallas Court-at-Law, which is one of three courts with concurrent jurisdiction over such cases in Dallas.94 The Texas Study
examined several of the same metrics which were examined in
Debt Deception and which are examined in this study. Some of
the findings from Texas differed from the findings of the Debt
Deception study. Whereas Debt Deception showed a default rate
of 81% in New York, 95 In the Texas sample, only about 40% of
cases resulted in default judgment. 96 Further, the Texas study
found that 50% were dismissed without prejudice. 97 Finally, the
Texas study showed that in 12% of cases, debt buyers were unable to serve the defendant; 98 in nearly 23% of served cases the defendants appeared;99 and that defendants were represented by a
lawyer in almost 10% of served cases. 100
Judith Fox’s 2012 study analyzed the activity of debt buyers in Indiana through a sample of 645 cases. 101 In Indiana, debt
buyers often chose to avoid filing in small claims courts, even
though they were well within the jurisdictional limit. 102 Indiana,
like Maryland, changed its rules to increase the documentary requirements upon debt buyers filing collection cases, and this apId. at 5, 14.
Id. at 4.
92
Id.
93
Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of
Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and the Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
257, 274-77 (2011).
94
Id. at 273.
95
WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8.
96
Spector, supra note 93, at 296.
97
Id. at 296.
98
Id. at 278.
99
Id. at 288.
100
Id. at 289.
101
See Fox, supra note 12.
102
Id. at 374-76.
90
91
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peared to have temporarily suppressed filings.103 Indiana also had
high rates of non-appearance, with 83% of defendants failing to
respond and only 2.5% not served. 104 Of those who responded to
the complaint, most did not do so in the form required by court
rules. 105 Debt buyers obtained default judgment in 73% of cases. 106 As in the Debt Deception, none of the cases examined resulted in a trial. 107
One other study, somewhat different from the others, is
important to the discussion. In her 1992 study of Baltimore
City’s rent court, 108 Barbara Bezdek observed many of the same
phenomena as were observed in this study: special accommodation of plaintiff’s representatives, 109 high rates of default, 110 and a
general lack of evidentiary proof. 111
Unlike previous studies, this study examines a large number of online court dockets from a statewide sample in a unified
system comprised of twenty-six different counties. Maryland has
a unified online trial court docket, and a search for any given party or attorney on the state courts’ official “Maryland Judiciary
Case Search” website returns results for all trial courts in the
state, regardless of geography or jurisdictional amount. 112 Maryland Judiciary Case Search includes for each case the names of
the parties, city, state, case number, trial date, and disposition.113
Id. at 373.
Id. at 377. Note however that it was “assumed that service was perfected unless the file reflects otherwise.” Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 381.
107
Note that a small number of cases went to trial in Spector’s study:
Spector, supra note 93, at 297, tbl.14 (discussing one case which resulted in a
trial with judgment for the defendant, and showing the breakdown of outcomes generally).
108
Barbara L. Bezdek, Silence in Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). For
a more recent examination of the plight of tenants, and continuing flaws in
substantive and procedural law, see Mary Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles
and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 407
(2007).
109
Id. at 551-53.
110
Nearly 70% of cases resulted in complete success for the plaintiff landlord. Id. at 554.
111
Id. at 562.
112
See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, MARYLAND COURTS,
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/processDisclaimer.jis.
113
Id.
103
104
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This study was limited to cases filed in the District Court, which
has exclusive original jurisdiction for cases under $5,000, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court for cases between
$5,000 and $30,000. All cases studied also included the names of
any attorneys and law firms, the amount sought in the complaint,
and the amount of any judgment, plus separate itemizations for
any fees, costs or interest added to the judgment. Unlike the federal PACER system or other state systems, the Maryland website
does not provide access to actual case documents. Those have to
be retrieved from the courthouse in which they were filed, with
the exception of older cases outside the scope of this study, which
are sent to a central repository in the state’s capital.

II. THE STUDY
A. Methodology
With the aid of two teaching assistants and the students
enrolled in the Consumer Protection Clinic at the University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, we did a random
sampling of 200 cases filed in 2009 and 200 cases filed in 2010
(400 cases total), filed by each of 11 debt buyer plaintiffs, resulting in a total sample size of 4,400. 114 The specific 11 debt buyers
were selected because they constituted the highest volume filers
in the state of Maryland. 115
The debt buyers selected were: Pasadena Receivables, Inc.; Midland
Funding LLC (also known as Midland Credit Management); Arrow Financial
Services, LLC; LVNV Funding, LLC; Asset Acceptance, LLC; Portfolio Recovery Associates; Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC; Advantage Assets II, INC;
North Star Capital Acquisition; Fradkin & Weber, PA; Atlantic Credit & Finance, INC. A twelfth debt buyer, Equable Ascent Financial, LLC, also
known as Hilco Receivables, was originally included in the list, but proved to
have too few filings in 2009.
115
All had filed over 1,000 cases in the 2009-2010 period. This proved to
be a practical approach to identifying significant debt buyers: the highest volume filer for the subject time period was Pasadena Receivables, Inc. which
filed 24,435 cases during 2009-2010. During the years 2011-2013, consolidation
occurred in the industry. In 2012 the largest volume filers in Maryland were
Pasadena Receivables (and its new alter-ego, Maryland Portfolios), Midland
Funding, and Portfolio Recovery Associates. Pasadena is local and privately
held, while Midland Funding and Portfolio Recovery are publicly traded and
national, Figures from the first half of 2013 suggest that Pasadena will behind
Asset Acceptance this year.
114
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The years 2009 and 2010 were selected because they were
the most recent years that had a high percentage of case outcomes
that had reached a final disposition of judgment or dismissal. In
contrast, many cases filed during 2011 had not yet reached an
outcome at the time the data were gathered. 116 Finally, all cases
studied were subject to the Maryland Affidavit Judgment Rules
that existed prior to the implementation of new Rules on January
1, 2012. 117 While a companion study for cases filed after January
1, 2012 might yield insight into the efficacy of the new rules, such
a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article. 118
The data on each pre-selected debt buyer were gathered
from Maryland Judiciary Case Search, pursuant to a protocol
that insured that the cases were selected at random. 119 Maryland
Judiciary Case Search provides free access to a limited amount of
information on cases filed in Maryland courts, including the district courts which have exclusive original jurisdiction over “small
claims” cases of under $5,000.00 (typically credit card or medical
debt), and which consequently deal with almost all debt buyer
cases in Maryland.120 The study data included information on filing and judgment dates, types of judgments, the amount of money sought and awarded, and a breakdown of amounts awarded in
addition to the initial claim (i.e., costs, interest, and attorneys’
fees). Most importantly, the data also included information about
116
Examination of the data gathered has since shown that it takes a year
or more from filing for some types of outcome to be reached. Had more recent
cases been used, the results would have showed a distorted picture of the outcomes, with a disproportionately high number of affidavit judgments: affidavit
judgments took an average of less than 150 days, while default judgments took
almost 340 days on average and dismissals for lack of prosecution under MD.
R. 3-507 took over 400 days.
117
MD. R. 3-306.
118
We did analyze a small sample of 100 cases filed after January 1, 2012,
and those results are reported in Section II.C. Based on this smaller sample,
there does not appear to be any significant change in rates of default judgments since the rules changes.
119
See Maryland Judiciary Case Search, supra note 112.
120
But see sources cited supra note 47, which suggest that the sale and enforcement of mortgage deficiency judgments is on the rise in Maryland and
elsewhere. Case collection was limited to the District Courts because the Circuit Courts did not experience the same high volume of case filings. None of
the 11 selected debt buyers filed more than 100 cases in the Circuit Court between 2009 and 2012. The volume of cases in Circuit Court was therefore insufficient for a large-scale study of the kind possible using District Court cases.
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service of process, representation of the parties and the filing of
defenses. 121 In addition, the data from this study were compared
to the more limited data reported in the Maryland District
Court’s internal statistics used for tracking purposes, 122 as well as
the official Maryland Judiciary Annual Statistics Report. 123
B. Results
1. Amount Claimed in the Lawsuits Filed
The amount claimed in a lawsuit is a significant metric,
because it can determine jurisdictional questions, whether pretrial discovery will be allowed, whether a jury trial will be allowed,
and whether all of the formal rules of evidence will apply at trial.
In Maryland, lawsuits in which the principal amount sought is
$5,000 or less (exclusive of costs, interest and attorneys’ fees) are
treated as “small claims,” with less formality and fewer procedural safeguards. More broadly, the amount claimed is a significant
metric because it reflects the financial impact of debt collection
suits on communities and on the economy.
In the data sample of all 4,400 cases, 83% of the lawsuits
claimed a principal amount of less than $5,000.00, thus qualifying
them as “small claims.” This is significant because in practice,
these “less than $5,000” cases get treated as “small claims” in
which few or no rules of evidence are applied and in which few if
any procedural safeguards are observed. Put another way, in only
17% of the cases could a defendant even potentially have the
right to the benefit of pretrial discovery, or of all the rules of evidence. Further, to be eligible to demand and obtain a jury trial,
the principal amount claimed in the lawsuit must be more than
$15,000.
The average amount of principal claimed was $2,993.73,
according to the following distribution: 27% sought less than
$1,000; 56% sought between $1,000 and $5,000, and 17% sought
more than $5,000. The 17% of cases over the small claims limit
The complete protocol is contained in Appendix A, infra.
District Court of Maryland Statistics, MARYLAND COURTS,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/about.html#stats.
123
The official annual report is less useful than the internal statistics. See
Annual
Reports,
MARYLAND
COURTS,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreports.html
121
122
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were distributed in a narrowing tail, up to $30,000, as shown in
Figure 1, below.
Notably, the 17% of cases in which the amount claimed
was over $5,000, thus entitling the defendant to pretrial discovery
and the full range of the rules of evidence, did not experience significantly different outcomes from the cases below $5,000 in
which the defendant was not entitled to these added protections.
This is not surprising when one considers that few consumers
know their legal rights, let alone how to assert them.
Figure 1 - Amounts Demanded

The average principal amount sought in the total data
sample of 4,400 cases was $2,993.17. Of the 2,006 cases that resulted in judgment, the average amount sought in principal was
$2,967.58. In these 2,006 cases where judgment was entered, debt
buyers were awarded 94.7% of the principal claimed in the lawsuit ($2,811.66 out of $2,967.58).
Although the average amount of the judgment principal
was $2,811.66, the average total amount awarded (including any
pre-judgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees) was $3,323.76. In
other words, assuming that the consumer actually borrowed the
full $2,811.66 as principal (i.e. assuming it did not include any
late fees, over limit fees or interest, which is almost never the
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case), the data show that consumers got an average of $512.10
(18.2%) tacked onto the judgment. The bulk of this amount was
interest and attorneys’ fees. “Costs” (which presumably include a
private process server’s fee) averaged only 11.6% ($59.75) of the
additional $512.10. In terms of dollar value, prejudgment interest
was the single largest amount added to a judgment. Prejudgment
interest was added in 67% of the cases (1,347 out of 2,006) in
which judgment was entered in favor of the debt buyer plaintiff.
The average amount of prejudgment interest added in these 67%
of cases won by the plaintiff was $476. This is a significant figure,
in that it amounts to almost 10% of the jurisdictional amount of
$5,000, when 83% of all cases were for an amount claimed of less
than $5,000. Finally, in 561 cases an average of $474 was awarded for attorneys’ fees. The bottom line is that debt buyers obtained judgment that was almost one fifth (18.2%) greater than
the principal amount of the debt that they purchased for pennies
on the dollar.
Pre-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees are particularly
significant because they should usually require proof greater than
that required to prove a simple debt. If a plaintiff claims attorneys’ fees or pre-judgment interest at a contractual rate, the
plaintiff must prove that such amounts are provided for in the
underlying contract. 124 Further, under the American Rule, attorneys’ fees may be awarded only pursuant to a statute or contract,
and they should not be awarded to law firms which are themselves debt buyers, or are owned by debt-buyers, because Maryland prohibits attorneys who act in their own interests from
charging attorneys’ fees. 125
MD. R. 3-306(d)(1).
See, e.g., Weiner v. Swales, 141 A.2d 749 (Md. 1958). The Financial
Services division of the Attorney General’s office has successfully pursued at
least one debt buyer for violation of this rule. Settlement Agreement & Consent
Order at ¶11(b), Sunshine Financial Group, LLC, Nos. CFR-FY2012-019 &
CFR-FY2011-135 (Md. Collection Agency Licensing Bd. Sept 9, 2011), available
at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/consumers/pdf/sunshinesettlement.pdf
(finding that Sunshine violated Maryland and Federal debt collection law by
claiming attorney’s fees not permitted in law). Since the Sunshine case, other
firms in similar positions have stopped seeking attorneys’ fees. Moreover, one
of the compromises in the revised Rules was that, starting on January 1, 2012,
a debt buyer who was seeking affidavit judgment at the time of filing the lawsuit need not produce the underlying contract if (1) it was not seeking pre124
125
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2. How Consumers Respond to Debt Buyer Lawsuits
Previous studies have found that the overwhelming majority of consumers do not formally defend collection suits against
them. 126 This study confirms that finding. Even when the figures
were adjusted to remove those defendants who were not served
with a complaint,127 eighty-five percent of all consumers failed to
file a defense in writing (known in Maryland as a “Notice of Intention to Defend”). The lack of consumer engagement in debt
collection cases is an ongoing problem that escapes resolution. At
the June 2013 joint Federal Trade Commission/Consumer Financial Protection Bureau workshop titled “The Life of a Debt”
much was made of this problem, but no solutions were offered. 128
Figure 2 demonstrates that: (1) 85% of the 2,947 consumers served with a complaint did not file a written response; (2)
13% filed a response by themselves; and (3) 2% had a lawyer at
the time of or after a response was filed.
Figure 2 – How Consumers Respond to Suits
Everyone
People Who were Served
N
%
N
%
Represented by
Lawyer
52
1%
52
2%
Responded
Pro Se
397
9%
397
13%
Did Not
Respond
3951
90%
2498
85%
Total
4400
100%
2947
100%
The finding that only 2% of the people had a lawyer is
consistent with the findings of other studies. 129 On closer examijudgment interest in excess of 6%; and (2) it was not seeking attorneys’ fees.
The practical result has been that since January 1, 2012, debt buyers in Maryland always seek 6% prejudgment interest, and they never seek attorneys’ fees
and they do not attach the underlying contract. See MD. R. 3-306.
126
See supra Part I.E.
127
Because the study relied on electronic court records, it was not possible
to determine if actual service took place in all of these cases. Defective or “sewer” service may still be depressing the response rate of consumer defendants.
128
See Life of a Debt, supra note 32.
129
See supra Part I.E.
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nation, the number of consumers actually defended in the lawsuit
by a lawyer is likely to be even smaller: in 5 of the 52 cases where
the defendant had a lawyer, the defendant declared bankruptcy.
The attorney whose name appears on the record may therefore
simply have been acting in relation to the bankruptcy, rather
than actively defending the case. A Notice of Intention to Defend
was filed in only one of these five cases, and in a different case the
attorney appears to have assisted the defendant in challenging a
post-judgment garnishment, but the lawyer did not defend the
underlying lawsuit.
3. Bankruptcies
Figure 3 shows bankruptcies filed by defendants and the
amounts sought in the complaint. Defendants declared bankruptcy in 261of 4,400 cases. 130 An attorney appearance was filed in only 5 of these 261 cases. Consumers filed for bankruptcy even
though no money judgment was entered in about 56% of the cases, and in the remaining 44%, when a money judgment had been
entered. 131 With an average amount claimed of $4,450, bankruptcy cases were significantly larger (almost 50% higher) than the
average of $2,993.73 claimed overall. 132
Figure 3 – Bankruptcies Observed
Bankruptcies
Notice Filed
Pre Judgment
Notice Filed
Post Judgment
Total

N

%

Total
Complaints

Average
Complaint

147

56%

$ 680,988.84

$ 4,632.58

114
261

44%
100%

$ 480,680.88
$ 1,161,669.72

$ 4,216.50
$ 4,450.84

130
Case Search records Bankruptcy as a case status rather than as a case
outcome – therefore bankruptcies out of the total sample, rather than cases
with a final outcome.
131
The distinction of presence vs. absence of a money judgment was made
because the actual dates of the bankruptcy filing were not a part of the data
which gathered pursuant to the protocol.
132
See infra Figure 3.

Holland4.docx (Do Not Delete)

210

Loyola Consumer Law Review

3/16/2014 2:17 PM

Vol. 26:2

4. Unrepresented Consumers Fare Poorly
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that 925 of
the 4,400 cases sampled were dismissed when the defendant was
never served. In 702 of these cases, the court record reflects that
the dismissal was due to lack of prosecution or lack of jurisdiction. In other words, according to the data sample, 24% of all cases filed were never served. While no firm conclusions can be
drawn from the fact that 24% of cases were never served, three
possibilities seem likely: (1) a large number of defendants settled
prior to the law suit getting served, which obviated the need for
service; (2) debt buyer documentation is so stale that they cannot
obtain accurate current location information on defendants; or (3)
the debt buyer business model is structured such that it is not
profitable to invest resources into locating current addresses for
defendants.
Of the 2,947 cases that were served and reached final outcome, 2,498 people (85% of the total) did not file a response; 397
people (13%) filed a pro se response; and 52 people (2%) had a
lawyer who entered an appearance in the case.
Of the 2,947 cases that were served and reached final outcome, 2,006 (68%) resulted in a money judgment against the defendant, in an average amount of $3,323.76. Yet, only 9 (0.4%) of
the judgments were the result of a trial. Outcomes varied depending on whether the person (1) filed no response; (2) filed a response; or (3) had a lawyer who entered an appearance in the
case.
Defendants who filed no response had the worst outcomes.
Of the 85% of people who did not file a response, debt buyers obtained a judgment by affidavit, consent, default, or trial 73% of
the time, and recovered 82% of the amount sought in the complaints.
Defendants who filed a response had better outcomes than
those who did not file a response, but the outcomes were poor
overall. Of the 13% of defendants who proceeded pro se (by filing
a response called a Notice of Intention to Defend), debt buyers
obtained judgment by affidavit, consent, default, or trial 47% of
the time, and recovered 62% of the amount sought in the complaints.
Defendants who had a lawyer fared best. Of the 2% of de-
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fendants who had a lawyer enter an appearance in the case, debt
buyers obtained an affidavit, consent, or default judgment only
15% of the time, and recovered only 21% of the principal amount
sought in the complaints. 133 However defendants were represented by a lawyer in only 52 cases, and it is clear that different lawyers provided different levels of service, rendering this data not
statistically significant enough to be a reliable measurement.
Nevertheless, data from outside of this study confirms what is
widely believed: lawyers make a difference. A 2013 unpublished
study of the Maryland’s Pro Bono Resource Committee’s Consumer Protection Project found that of 80 cases in which pro bono attorneys represented defendants in collection suits by debt
buyers, debt buyers obtained final money judgments in only 12
cases (15%). Overwhelmingly, defendants with an attorney succeeded in having the case dismissed. 134
Figure 4 - Outcomes by Representation
No Notice to
Defend Filed Notice Filed
Outcome
n
%
n
%
Money Judgment
1812 73% 186 47%
% of Total Complaint
Amounts awarded

82%

62%

Attorney
n
%
8
15%
21%

133
The fact that there were affidavit and default judgments when there
was an attorney of record suggests that the attorney involvement commenced
only after judgment was entered, but the data is not conclusive.
134
Study on file with the author.
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Figure 5 – Detailed Outcomes by Representation Status
No Notice
to Defend
Notice
Filed
Filed
Attorney
Total
Outcome
n
%
n
%
n
%
n
%
Affidavit
Judgment 135 1518 61% 96 24% 6 12% 1620 55%
Consent
Judgment for
P 136
231 9% 61 15% 2
4% 294 10%
Default
Judgment for
P 137
61 2% 22 6%
0
0%
83
3%
Dismissed
by Court
149 6% 66 17% 11 21% 226
8%
Rule 3-506
Dismissal 138 293 12% 69 17% 17 33% 379 13%
See MD. R. 3-306. To seek affidavit judgment the plaintiff must demand it and file an affidavit to support it at the time of filing the complaint.
MD. R. 3-506(b). If the defendant fails to file a Notice of Intention to Defend
(“NOID”), the court may grant judgment without a trial, provided the affidavit
is sufficient. MD. R. 3-306(e)(2)(A). When the defendant files a NOID, but fails
to appear at trial, it appears that some clerks record the resulting judgment as
an affidavit judgment, hence the presence of 96 affidavit judgments among defendants who filed NOIDs.
136
A consent judgment may be entered at any time. MD. R. 3-612. However, consent judgments may represent enforcement of the terms of settlements, allowed by Rule 3-506(b).
137
A default judgment may be entered in two situations: where affidavit
judgment is denied, but on the trial date the defendant fails to appear; where a
NOID is filed but the defendant fails to appear. MD. R. 3-509. One anomalous
default judgment was entered where the plaintiff failed to appear at a hearing.
138
A form of voluntary dismissal where the plaintiff can dismiss without
the court’s permission provided no counterclaim has been made, and notice is
given to the parties and the court. MD. R. 3-506(a). The analysis of the specific
reason or reasons that cases were dismissed is limited, because the data in Case
Search often does not specify whether the dismissal was due to a voluntary settlement (pursuant to Rule 3-506(b)) or to any other of several factors listed in
Rule 3-506, or even factors which are not listed in Rule 3-506. One such factor
may be that debt buyers have been known to settle or dismiss as soon as they
become aware that a case might be contested. Similarly, collection phone calls
and letters do not stop just because a lawsuit was filed. In fact, it seems axiomatic that people who are served with a lawsuit are more likely to make a settlement than those who have not. This is another area that warrants study, but
135
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Rule 3-506(B)
Dismissal
upon
stipulated
terms 139
164 7% 58 15% 7 13% 229
8%
Rule 3-507
Dismissal 140
78 3% 14 4%
2
4%
94
3%
Trial
Judgment for
P
2
0%
7
2%
0
0%
9
0%
Trial
Judgment for
D
2
0%
3
1%
7 13% 12
0%
Default
Judgment for
D
0
0%
1
0%
0
0%
1
0%
Total
2498 100% 397 100% 52 100% 2947 100%
5. Settlement
Settlements between debt buyers and unrepresented defendants 141 are fairly common. Of the 2,498 people who were
served and did not file a Notice of Intention to Defend, 395 (16%)
settled. Some of these settlements (164, 42%) were recorded as
Rule 3-506(b) dismissals, so their terms are unknown. The remaining 231 (58%) were consent judgments, the terms of which
are known. Most of consent judgments (183, or 79%) were for the
amount demanded in the complaint. The forty-eight defendants
(21%) who settled for a reduced amount achieved an average reduction of 19%. However, outcomes were not evenly distributed:
which is beyond the scope of this article.
139
A dismissal based upon a settlement. The case may be reinstated in order to “enforce the stipulated terms.” MD. R. 3-506(b). A dismissal on stipulated terms may therefore become a consent judgment if the terms are not kept.
140
A lawsuit is subject to dismissal by the court if the complaint has not
been served for more than a year, or if there have been no docket entries for
one year. MD. R. 3-507.
141
In this context, “unrepresented” is used to designate those people who
did not have a lawyer, and who did not file a Notice of Intention to Defend.
“Self-represented” is used to designate people who did not have a lawyer, but
who did file a Notice of Intent to Defend.
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twenty-two (10%) achieved a reduction of less than 10%, while
four achieved reductions of over 50%. These results suggest that
even the few defendants who do settle their cases with plaintiffs
do not usually benefit much from the resulting settlement. A very
small group was successful in achieving a significant reduction in
the alleged debt, but most are no better off than if they had simply waited for affidavit judgment.
Self-represented defendants (i.e. those who filed a Notice
of Intent to Defend) fared little better. More of them settled: 119
out of 397 (30%) as opposed to 16% of the unrepresented. Of
these settlements, sixty-one (51%) were consent judgments. Most
of these consent judgments (forty-three, 69%) were for the same
amount as the complaint. Where the judgment was for less than
the amount in the complaint, it was reduced by an average of
23%. Again, however, only a small number of defendants benefitted the most, as shown in Figure 6, below.
Figure 6 - Consent Judgments 142

6. Trends in Debt buyer Activity
In addition to the cases from 2009 and 2010 which are
studied above in detail, the total number of lawsuits filed in Maryland by the subject debt buyers was calculated for the period
142
Here, “No NOID” denotes people who were unrepresented (i.e. the
people who did not have a lawyer and who did not file a Notice of Intent to
Defend). “NOID” represents people who did not have a lawyer, but who did
file a Notice of Intent to Defend.
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from January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013. In Maryland,
debt buyers filed more than 37,000 cases in 2011, more than
22,000 cases in 2012, and more than 24,000 cases in 2013. 143
Thus, as calculated in Figure 7, the total number of filings in
Maryland by the subject debt buyers during each year from 2009
through 2013 was as follows: 40,796 in 2009; 43,581 in 2010;
37,202 in 2011; 22,566 in 2012; and 24,317 in 2013. It is clear that
filings hit their peak in 2010, their low point in 2012, and perhaps
began to rebound in 2013. It is unclear – and worthy of further
study to determine - whether the dramatic decline in filings is due
to market forces, to regulatory action, to the 2012 changes to the
Maryland Rules, or some other factor or combination of factors.
It is also unclear whether the pattern in Maryland is reflected in
other states.

There is an additional group of debt buyers who were either nonexistent or not as active in 2009-2010 as they were after that time frame. Adding
the gross number of filings of this new group raises the total filings in 2011 to
37,202; in 2012 to 22,566; and in 2013 to 24,317. This new group consists of the
following entities: Credit Acceptance, Osiris Holdings, Unifund CCR, Razor
Capital, and Maryland Portfolios.
143
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Figure 7 – Number of Cases & Market Share of Debt Buyers,
2009-2012
Years
Debt Buyer

2009

%

2010

%

2011

%

2012

%

2013

% Totals

Advantage Assets, II, INC

462

1%

1685

4%

144

0%

0

0%

1

0%

2291

5376 13% 2321

5%

75

0%

1

0%

1

0%

7773

2978

9%

1154

3%

492

2%

2208

9%

8394

Arrow Financial Services,
LLC
Asset Acceptance, LLC

7%

3770

Atlantic Credit & Finance,
INC

1712

4%

979

2%

97

0%

2

0%

14

0%

2790

CACH

2701

7%

2146

5%

817

2%

210

1%

1093

4%

5874

LLC

990

2%

1223

3%

1791

5%

354

2%

1602

7%

4358

Commercion

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

45

0%

1

0%

45

Credit Acceptance

824

2%

1013

2%

3234

9%

1399

6%

1531

6%

6470

Equable Ascent

50

0%

1612

4%

3539 10%

250

1%

145

1%

5451

Fortis Capital

57

0%

38

0%

31

0%

0

0%

0

0%

126

Fradkin & Weber, PA

249

1%

3748

9%

102

0%

20

0%

3

0%

4119

LVNV Funding, LLC

2756

7%

4445 10% 5205 14%

0

0%

5

0% 12406

Cavalry Portfolio Services,

Midland Funding, LLC

5546 14% 4839 11% 14242 38% 10786 48% 9619 40% 35413

North Star Capital
Acquisition

1155

3%

540

1%

64

0%

1

0%

1

0%

1760

Osiris Holdings

0

0%

84

0%

404

1%

31

0%

208

1%

519

Palisades Collection LLC

345

1%

520

1%

101

0%

21

0%

9

0%

987

9%

1085

Pasadena Receivables, INC 13570 33% 10865 25% 3688 10% 2122
Portfolio Recovery Associates 1608

4% 30245

4%

2651

6%

2189

6%

6328 28% 6608 27% 12776

Razor

0

0%

128

0%

40

0%

314

1%

103

0%

482

Sherman

20

0%

0

0%

0

0%

4

0%

0

0%

24

LLC

36

0%

822

2%

231

1%

4

0%

0

0%

1093

Unifund

361

1%

152

0%

54

0%

182

1%

80

0%

749

TOTALS

40796

43581

37202

22566

24317

MONTHLY AVERAGE

3399.67

3631.75

3100.17

1880.50

2026.42

Sunshine Financial Group,

168,462
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Figure 8 - Total Debt Buyer Filings in Maryland District Courts,
Jan. 1, 2009 to December 31, 2013

Polls by InsideARM, a debt-collection trade publication,
show that despite the overall trend that Figure 8 appears to show,
the purchase and sale of junk debt is a continuing feature of the
debt collection industry. 144 Given the number of private class actions and public enforcement actions by the state of Maryland
against prominent debt buyers in Maryland, the decline in the
volume of lawsuits may also reflect a decision to increase collections through non-litigation means such as letters and phone
calls. 145 There are, however, no signs that the debt buying industry is disappearing or that the problems identified by the Rules
Committee have been solved. The filing of tens of thousands of
debt buyer lawsuits continues to be a significant load on Maryland’s courts and consumers.
In Summer 2011, the last period for which InsideARM has published
figures, 37.2% of original creditors were increasing their use of debt collection
agencies or debt buyers while 22.9% were maintaining the same level of usage.
The ARM Barometer: Creditor Results, INSIDEARM.COM, (Summer 2011),
http://www.insidearm.com/features/arm-barometer/summer-2011/creditorresults/. Most debt buyers reported an increase in activity in the same period:
42.9% moderate, 14.3% large. The ARM Barometer: Debt Buyer Results, InsideARM.com, (Summer 2011), http://www.insidearm.com/features/armbarometer/summer-2011/results-debt-buyers/.
145
While the shift from litigation to non-litigation based collection would
be an interesting subject for further study, it is a difficult area to research empirically, because non-litigation based collection does not leave the same type
of broad paper trail in the public records.
144
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While some debt buyers have stopped filing collection cases in Maryland, others have increased their filings. Encore Capital Group (parent of Midland Funding, LLC) purchased Asset
Acceptance, Inc. in mid-2013, leaving only three major players in
Maryland, where there were once more than ten. 146
7. Geographic Concentration of Cases
Debt buyers sued disproportionately in jurisdictions with
larger concentrations of poor people and racial minorities. For
example, Prince George’s County has only 15% of the Maryland’s
population, yet 23% of all debt buyer complaints were filed
against Prince George’s County residents. 147 A disparity also exists in Baltimore City, as illustrated in the Figure 9 below.
Figure 9 – Cases and Population in Top Six Jurisdiction

As Figure 9 shows, based on filing rates and population estimates for 2010, 148 Prince George’s County and Baltimore City have a
greater proportion of debt buyer cases than that of the general population. In contrast, Baltimore, Montgomery and Anne Arundel CounSee supra Figure 7, showing the market share of various debt buyers in
Maryland.
147
See infra Figure 9.
148
Population figures from the 2010 United States Census, complied by
the Maryland Department of Planning. MD. DEPT. PLANNING, 2000-2010
INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES BY GENDER, RACE & ORIGIN (2012) [hereinafter
INTERCENSAL
ESTIMATES],
available
at
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/IntercensalEst00_10/MDEst_2000to2010_b
yRace&Origin.xls.
146
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ties have fewer cases based on population, while Harford seems to be
evenly balanced.
The differences between these areas can be better shown
by comparing some of their basic demographics. As Figure 10
shows, there is no straightforward connection between either median income or race, and disparities in the filing rate in these jurisdictions. Baltimore City households have nearly half the median income of Maryland, and Baltimore City is a “majorityminority” jurisdiction, but its case-to-population disparity is only
2% (i.e. Baltimore City’s share of cases was 2% more than its
share of Maryland’s population). Prince George’s County has a
nonwhite population 5% higher than Baltimore City, and slightly
above average income, but its case-to-population disparity is 8%.
Baltimore County, with a slightly lower than median income and
a slightly higher nonwhite population fared similarly to Anne Arundel County, which has significantly higher income and lower
nonwhite population.
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Figure 10 – Comparison of High Filing Jurisdictions

County
Prince
George’s
County
Baltimore
County
Baltimore
City
Montgomery
County
Anne
Arundel
County
Harford
County

Median Income 149
Race 150
Population
Difference
Difference
from State Non- from State
Income Median White
%
People 151 Cases Disparity 152

$72,178

1%

74%

35%

863420 1020

8%

$64,814

-9%

34%

-5%

805029

569

-1%

$39,561

-45%

69%

30%

620961

565

2%

$94,358

32%

36%

-3%

971777

580

-4%

$84,409

18%

22%

-16%

537656

347

-1%

$78,648

10%

18%

-21%

244826

186

0%

—

39%

—

5773552 4400

—

Maryland $71,294

However, the general trends in this comparison suggest
that race and wealth make a difference: the counties with the
fewest proportionate share of lawsuits are richer and less diverse
149
Median Income figures are from the American Communities Survey
(ACS), 3 year estimates for 2009-2011. MD. DEPT. PLANNING, MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN MARYLAND’S JURISDICTIONS (THREE YEAR ACS
DATA)
2009-2011,
available
at
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/HH_Income/ACS_3yr_Household_Median
_Income_2011.xls. Disparity figures are the percentage deviation from the median income for Maryland.
150
From the 2010 United States Census, complied by the Maryland Department of Planning. INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES, supra note 148.
151
Id.
152
“Disparity” represents the difference between each jurisdiction’s proportion of Maryland’s population and that jurisdiction’s proportion of the
sampled cases. For example, Prince George’s County has 15% of the Maryland’s population but had 23% of the sampled cases, so the disparity between
cases and population is 8%: Prince George’s County had 8% more cases than
the size of its population indicates it should.
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than Maryland as a whole.
An analysis based on zip codes or census tracts would enable a more detailed comparison of case data with census data.
Alternatively, further study specifically dedicated to the disparate
impact of debt collection suits would go a long way towards determining whether debt-buyer suits disproportionately affect particular groups.
C. Follow-Up
As noted above, the rules governing affidavit judgments in
Maryland changed on January 1, 2012. 153 In order to explore the
immediate effects of these changes, a sample size of 100 cases
filed after January 1, 2012, was analyzed using the same protocol
as for the original study. 154
Of the 100 follow-up cases gathered, 83 resulted in a final
outcome, of which 55 (66%) were judgments against the Defendant. Analysis of this limited sample suggests limited changes following the introduction of the new rules.
First, the new sample had a larger dollar value on average, while the amount of the judgment was smaller on average.
Specifically, while the original sample had an average complaint
amount of $2,993, in the follow-up it was $3,248. In the original
sample, the average total judgment was $3,323, but in the followup it was $2,594. Part of this change may be accounted for by a
substantial drop in awards of interest and attorneys’ fees, which
is a direct result of the new Rule 3-306. Pre-judgment interest was
awarded in 67% of judgments in the original sample, but only
25% in the follow up sample, while awards of attorneys’ fees
dropped from 28% in the original sample to 13% in the follow-up
sample.
Second, the follow-up shows an increase in the proportion
of affidavit judgments, from 55% of served cases with outcomes
from the original sample, to 63% of similar cases in the follow up

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Due to the consolidation that has occurred in the industry, only 5 of the
original debt buyers had sufficient numerous filings to sample in 2012: Pasadena Receivables, Midland Funding, Cavalry Portfolio, Asset Acceptance and
Portfolio Recovery Associates. The cutoff date for gathering data for this sample was November 15, 2013.
153
154
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sample. 155 This is somewhat puzzling, given the increased requirements of the new rules. It is possible that the result is an artifact of other changes and not a real increase in the frequency of
default judgments. Likewise, it could mean that the cases filed
under the new rules are of a better quality. The increase corresponded with a drop in Rule 3-507 dismissals. The proportion of
cases “active” was also higher in the follow-up than in the original
sample. This suggests that some cases in the follow-up will be
dismissed eventually. At the time of sampling, there were simply
too many possible influences on the affidavit judgments to draw
firm conclusions regarding the impact of the new rules.
Third, more defendants defended themselves in the follow-up: 24% of defendants who were served filed a Notice of Intention to Defend in the follow-up, compared with only 15% in
the original sample. It is, however, difficult to relate this development to the new affidavit judgment rule. The increased filings
of Notices of Intent to Defend may be a result of generally increased awareness about the flaws of debt buyer lawsuits, or the
fact that there is now a formal pro bono legal assistance program
in effect to defend debt buyer lawsuits, or due to other factors.
Finally, several metrics showed no significant change in
the follow-up: the rate of service, geographical distribution of
cases, attorney representation 156 and proportion of bankruptcy filings.
The proportion of cases served was the same in both samples: 76%.
Because representation is so rare, as shown by the original sample, a
larger follow-up would be required to state with any certainty that attorney
representation was unchanged. In addition to the nascent emergence of a formal pro bono representation program in debt buyer cases, the District Court in
partnership with the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau has also created and rapidly
expanded a “Self-Help Center” that has provided assistance to literally tens of
thousands of pro se litigants, many of whom are defending debt buyer lawsuits. A 2012 University of Maryland study of the Self-Help Center concluded
that “There was also evidence, drawn from analyses of case event data obtained from the Judiciary’s management information system, suggesting that
cases involving clients of the Center, when compared with cases involving selfrepresented litigants who did not receive Center services, showed greater understanding and engagement of litigants about the case, and improved chances
for judgments being based on merits and rights, rather than default.” Evaluation of the Glen Burnie District Court Self-Help Center, UNIV. OF MD. INST.
FOR
GOVERNMENTAL
SERV.
AND
RESEARCH,
http://www.igsr.umd.edu/applied_research/displaymedia.php?mediaID=26
(last updated Feb. 18, 2014).
155
156
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III. ANALYSIS
The following three sections contain an analysis of the
findings described in Part II. Section A describes the implications
for providing legal assistance or representation to consumers sued
by debt buyers. Section B compares the findings of this study
with those of four other studies.
A. The Importance of Representation
Figure 5 shows that consumers sued by a debt buyer have
the worst outcomes when they do nothing and the best outcomes
when they are represented by an attorney. When consumers did
nothing, the cases against them were dismissed about 20% of the
time. In contrast, the less than 2% of defendants who had a lawyer achieved a dismissal rate of about 70%.
Although Maryland has over 30,000 lawyers (22,500 of
whom are in private practice), 157 in 2009-2010, only thirty-eight
attorneys represented consumers in a total of fifty-two of the
4,400 cases sampled.
Extensive state funding for the representation of such defendants is unlikely under current budgetary conditions. Avenues
for improving representation and access to justice have been explored by the Maryland Access to Justice Commission including
fee shifting, 158 the implementation of a right to counsel in civil
cases, 159 and unbundled legal assistance for self-represented litigants. 160
A recent study by James Greiner and Cassandra PattaThe ABA estimates 23,000 lawyers were practicing in Maryland as of
2013, and about 75% of these were in private practice. MKT. RESEARCH
DEP’T, AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2013),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/Publi
cDocuments/2013_natl_lawyer_by_state.authcheckdam.pdf.
158
Md. Access to Justice Comm’n, Fee Shifting to Promote the Public Interest in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 38 (2011). The Commission’s proposals
focused on one-way fee shifting to support plaintiffs in civil rights and similar
cases, however, the resulting bill was unsuccessful in the legislature. MD.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 9-10 (2012) [hereinafter
MD.
ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/annualreport2012.pdf.
159
MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 158, at 10.
160
Id. at 1-4.
157
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nayak examines the impact of representing people pro bono. 161
Although it was not the main purpose of this study to explore this
question, some of the results of this study are relevant to that debate. The proceedings of the District Courts of Maryland are very
different from the subject-specific proceedings that the Greiner
study examined, and as the authors noted, the nature of both the
subject matter and the forum may mean that their results are not
generally applicable. 162 Reflecting on that study, Jeff Selbin and
several colleagues have suggested that more attention should be
paid to where and at what point in the process limited legal assistance resources should be tapped. 163 The instant study clearly
shows that consumer defendants had better outcomes when a
lawyer appeared in their case. However, the primary purpose of
this study is not to demonstrate the value of representation, but
rather to demonstrate what occurs in its absence.
As noted in Part II.B.5 above, the data regarding settlements suggests that in many cases, defendants who settle are as
badly off as those who are subjected to judgments. The problem
of settlements arose at the FTC/CFPB roundtable on “The Life
Cycle Of A Debt.” Thomas Lawrie, a Maryland Assistant Attorney General made the point that contact between debt-collecting
attorneys and unrepresented defendants provides collecting attorneys with an opportunity to push defendants to settle on terms
they do not understand and cannot afford. 164 Unsustainable setD. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012).
162
Greiner and Pattanayak used the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau’s work in
unemployment insurance cases. In explaining their results, the authors thought
that self-representation may have been easier in this particular type of case,
and that the administrative law judges hearing the cases may have compensated for the disadvantages of self-representation. Id. at 2150-51.
163
Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1099.pdf. A study addressing this
question is currently under way led by Dalié Jiménez and James Greiner. Dalié
Jiménez, D. James Greiner, Lois R. Lupica & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Improving
the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control
Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
449 (2013).
164
Patrick Lunsford, ARM Data Exchange Standards Focus of
FTC/CFPB Collection Roundtable, INSIDEARM.COM, (June 7, 2013),
161

Holland4.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

3/16/2014 2:17 PM

Junk Justice

225

tlements are likely to merely delay, rather than prevent, judgments. Further study would be required to determine exactly
what terms defendants in these cases generally receive, whether
they understand the terms of their settlements, and whether they
are in fact able to fulfill those terms. One obvious solution would
be to have a standard form settlement agreement that is realistic
and fair, and which provides that an alleged breach of the agreement should be met with a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement, rather than a default judgment in the full amount sued
for.
B. Comparison with Other Studies
Figure 11, below, sets out three key metrics gathered in
this and previous studies of debt buyer cases: (1) the percentage of
defendants who did not respond to the debt collection complaint;
(2) the percentage of defendants who were represented; and (3)
the percentage of cases which resulted in judgments against defendants, together with the sample size and years in which the
data were gathered.
The results show some clear trends, but also large disparities. Some of these disparities can be explained by methodological
differences between the studies. However, some disparities can
only be explained as real differences in the lawsuits studied.
These differences might arise because of the circumstances at the
time of each study, differences between the geographical areas
studied, or the impact of differing law and procedure in the jurisdictions studied.

http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-buying-topics/debt-buying/arm-dataexchange-standards-focus-of-ftccfpb-collection-roundtable/.
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Figure 11 – Comparison of Key Results

This Study
Spector
Study 167
Fox Study 168
Debt
Deception
Study 170
Debt
Collection
Racket
Study 171

Defendant
failed to
respond
85%

Defendant
represented Judgments
< 2%
73% 165

Overall
Sample
Size
4400 166

Year
Studied
2009-2010

77%
83%

10%
4%

44%
81% 169

507
645

2007
2009

—

0%

94%

365

2006-2008

94%-82%

2%

38-62% 172

168,807

2011

Consumers in
Trouble 173

70-98%

11-30%

91-92%

1504

1967

Bezdek
Study 174

85%

0.18%-2.8%

—

659

1991

165
This number is the sum of affidavit, default, consent and trial judgments,. See supra Figure 5.
166
As mentioned earlier, out of the 4,400 case sample, only 2,947 (76%) involved cases where the complaint was served on the defendant, and the case
reached final disposition.
167
Spector, supra note 93, at 288-289, 296.
168
Fox, supra note 12, at 377, 381. Fox’s figures do not account for defendants who were not served, so the true rate of default is higher. In addition,
Fox’s figure of 83% for non-response is that for total non-response. Many of
the responses were technically inadequate and may have been rejected by the
Court.
169
This figure is the aggregate of default, summary and consent judgments. Id. at 377.
170
WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8. The study did not
provide a figure for failure to respond complaints and observed no represented
defendants.
171
SHIN & WILNER, supra note 89, at 5-6. Note that these statistics varied
by jurisdiction. The sample included basic information from all civil collection
suits filed in New York. Id.
172
These figures represent the range of default judgment percentage
across New York jurisdictions. No figure is available in this study for nondefault judgments.
173
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 215, 221-223. The ranges given are the
ranges observed as between the cities in which court actions were studied:
New York, Detroit and Chicago.
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The clearest trend, repeatedly highlighted in the literature,
is that defendants often do not respond to collection suits. 175 This
has been recognized by industry and consumer advocacy at least
since the FTC’s roundtable discussions, leading to its Broken
System report. 176 The evidence suggests that the rate of default is
approximately 80-90%. 177 Comparison with the Baltimore rent
court study shows that failure to appear extends beyond consumer credit collection cases to rent cases. More recent figures from
elsewhere in the country suggest that tenant defendants fail to
appear just as often as the debt buyer defendants in this study.178
This is significant because of the high stakes involved in rent cases, in which tenants stand to lose, literally, the roof over their
heads. Despite the increased stakes, it appears that rent court defendants are no more likely to defend themselves in court than
the people who are sued by debt buyers. This suggests that coercing defendants to attend and participate in court by “raising the
stakes” (for example, through the creditor’s contempt discussed
by Shepard) is not effective.
Bezdek, supra note 108. This study is unlike the others because it concerns actions based on rent and some of the figures are not directly comparable. The range given for representation represents two figures—0.18% is the
representation rate based on court files and 2.8% the rate at which defendants
reported receiving legal advice. Id. at 556, n.79.
175
A lack of debtor participation came to be a central theme of the “Life of
A Debt” roundtable held by CFPB and FTC in June 2013. Lunsford, supra
note 164.
176
BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 7, n.18 (“There was a broad consensus among roundtable panelists that relatively few consumers who are sued for
alleged unpaid debts actually participate in the lawsuits… panelists from
throughout the country estimated that sixty percent to ninety five percent of
consumers debt collection lawsuits result in defaults, with most panelists indicating that the rate in their jurisdiction was close to 90%.”).
177
See supra Figure 11.
178
See, e.g., WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO
TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE
COURTS
2
(2005),
available
at
http://morrisinstituteforjustice.org/docs/254961FinalevictionreportP063.06.05.pdf (less than 20% of defendant-tenants appeared); KAREN DORAN,
JOHN GUZZARDO, KEVIN HILL, NEAL KITTERLIN, WENGFENG LI & RYAN
LIEBL, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A
STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 4 (2003) (56% of defendant tenants
appeared), available at http://lcbh.org/images/2008/10/chicago-eviction-courtstudy.pdf. That these rates differ widely suggests that just because the case is
high stakes for the individual they are not necessarily more likely to participate
in the case than in lower stakes cases.
174
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Lack of legal representation is another clear trend. Rates
of attorney representation of defendants in debt buyer cases vary
from 0% to 10%. Although representation rates are uniformly
low, the variation between studies is extremely high: the Spector
study suggests that five times as many defendants are represented
in these cases in Texas as compared to Maryland or New York. 179
Again, Spector’s figures may represent a difference in forum or
economic conditions.
While the rate at which consumers do not respond to the
lawsuit is uniformly high, actual rates of default judgment varied
widely, from 38% to 81%, across all jurisdictions and studies. The
New York studies accounted for both the highest and the lowest
rate, depending on jurisdiction and date. 180 Various results across
jurisdictions may reflect socioeconomic differences. As both New
York studies observe, and as has been true at least since the
1970s, debt collection is concentrated in poor areas, and falls disproportionately on minorities. 181
Figure 12 – Default Judgment Rates by County

County
Cases
Prince
George’s
1020
Montgomery 580
Baltimore
County
569
Baltimore
City
565

Rate of
Rate of
Default
Default Judgment
Cases Affidavit Judgment (Served
Served Judgments (All cases)
cases)
635
340

373
214

37%
37%

59%
63%

408

241

42%

59%

417

164

29%

39%

See supra Figure 11.
Compare WILNER & SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 8 (highest)
with SHIN & WILNER, supra note 89, at 6 (default judgment rate for New York
City Civil Courts, lowest).
181
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Collectors have also been
accused of intentionally targeting the poor, an allegation which they deny. Suein Hwang, Once-Ignored Consumer Debts Are Focus of Booming Industry,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Oct.
25,
2004,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109865776922954118.html.
179
180
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Figure12 182 shows the rate of affidavit judgments in the
four Maryland counties for which the most claims were recorded.
Montgomery County and Baltimore County are more affluent areas, 183 while Prince George’s County and Baltimore City are less
affluent with higher minority populations. Yet Baltimore City
has the lowest rate of default judgment and Montgomery the
highest. Baltimore City defendants appeared less frequently than
those in Montgomery and Prince George’s and as frequently as
those in Baltimore County. The difference in rates cannot be explained as a result of case loads, affluence or the willingness of
defendants to defend themselves. The likely explanation is that
there are differences in judicial attitude. While some judges might
believe that a failure to respond weighs heavily in favor of entry
of a default judgment, the rules for granting affidavit judgment
suggest otherwise. The law requires that before a judge may enter
affidavit judgment, the debt buyer, like any other plaintiff, must
present supporting documentation, plus an affidavit that affirmatively shows that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
asserted, that the affiant has personal knowledge of those matters, and that the affidavit is based on admissible evidence. 184
One surprising finding is that between the time of the
Caplovitz Consumers in Trouble study and the today, rates of defendant participation and representation appear to have dropped,
while at the same time courts have become progressively less willing to grant default judgments. This may reflect a difference in
methodology: Caplovitz’s rates were based on interviews with defendants, and he counted those who received advice from a lawyer, 185 while this and other modern studies detect only cases in
which a lawyer has actually entered an appearance on behalf of
the defendant in the court records.
The reason for the failures to appear remain a mystery
that will no doubt attract future study. In debt buyer cases, one of
the most common problems is that defendants do not recognize
Using the sample data gathered in this study.
For readers unfamiliar with Maryland geography, Baltimore County
and Baltimore City are distinct jurisdictions. The Baltimore City jurisdiction
occupies a roughly square area of 92 square miles centered on downtown Baltimore. Baltimore County surrounds Baltimore City and stretches north to the
Pennsylvania border, occupying 682 square miles.
184
MD. R. 3-306.
185
Id. at 222-224. For Caplovitz’s methodology, see id. at 8-10.
182
183
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the name of the plaintiff or the amount for which they are being
sued. 186 Further, most of the debts involved are unsecured credit
card debts, which are not associated with any particular object.
This disconnection, combined with the general lack of personal
involvement in modern consumer credit already noted above,
may be a significant cause of defendant default.
This suggestion may seem at odds with the results of
Bezdek’s 1992 rent court study. As noted, defendants failed to
appear just as often 20 years ago in Baltimore City rent court as
they do in the contemporary collection courts studied in this article. 187 Surely being subjected to eviction from one’s home is more
serious than being sued on a credit card. This may be so in some
respects, but Bezdek found that, at least by the time the tenants
reached rent court, the rental relationship was impersonal: there
were “a few instances of ‘mom-and-pop’ landlords bringing legitimate claims . . . . These actions were few and far between. The
primary operators in the rent court are a class of business
agents . . . .” 188
Bezdek noted the contrast between the deference accorded
to landlords’ agents in rent court and the impatience the court
generally showed towards tenants. 189 Censorious attitudes toward
debtors were also reported in 2006 by the Boston Globe, including routine threats of imprisonment. 190 The Globe concluded that
“[o]ften, debtors are treated with less courtesy than the accused
felons in the criminal court across the hall, and their rights are
less respected.” 191
186
Debt Buyers, OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/Publications/DebtBuyers.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (“Some people who are sued by debt buyers do not recognize
the name of the party who is suing them and ignore the lawsuit.”); WILNER &
SHEFTEL-GOMES, supra note 37, at 7 (“People sued by [a debt buyer] are often
faced with lawsuits that allege unfamiliar debts, filed by debt buyers whose
names they do not recognize.”); Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer
Debts, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 542, 545 (2010) (“[W]hen a debt buyer unknown to the consumer sends a letter claiming to be owed a debt . . . [t]he consumer likely does not even recognize the name on the envelope.”).
187
See supra Figure 11.
188
Bezdek, supra note 108, at 556.
189
Id. at 551-52 (noting that landlords and their agents were given some
control over the timing of their cases within the rent docket while tenants were
forced to wait with no indication when their cases would be called).
190
Healy, supra note 35.
191
Id.
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Behavior of this kind undermines procedural fairness and
damages public trust in the judiciary.192 Neutrality and respectful
treatment are among the key elements of the procedural fairness
that our society expects. 193 Too often, courts fall short of this
standard in collection cases. When, as the Boston Globe put it,
dignity faces a steamroller in the courts, 194 it is perhaps unsurprising that the public lacks confidence in the judicial process and so
fails to engage with the courts by filing defenses.
Whatever the real reason for default by defendants, and
despite the decline in defendant participation and representation,
the comparison to Caplovitz’s day is in one respect hopeful.
Then, the defendant almost invariably suffered a default judgment. 195 Today, a default judgment is no longer a foregone conclusion. Again this change may owe something to the subject
matter of these disputes. Back then, most plaintiffs were original
creditors suing on installment-type credit agreements, not debt
buyers suing upon on open-ended credit card accounts. The difference may simply represent the generally poor quality of debt
buyer suits. However, the growing evidence is that the lawsuits
filed by original creditors are just as shoddy and poorly documented as those filed by debt buyers. 196
However, it seems more likely that procedural changes
The importance of procedural fairness in public confidence in the judiciary was noted in a white paper of the American Judges Association in 2007.
Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public
Satisfaction, 44 COURT REV. 5 (2007).
193
Id. at 6.
194
Healy, supra note 35.
195
In over 90% of cases, a default judgment was entered for the Plaintiff.
See supra Figure 11.
196
See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitution, and Other Equitable Relief, People v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No.
BC508466, 2013 WL 1915821 (L.A. Cnty., Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 2013) (alleging various debt collection abuses); Consent Order, Order for Restitution, and
Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty, In re American Express Bank, FSB, No.
2012-CFPB-0003 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Oct. 1, 2012), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012-CFPB-0003-American-Express-BankFSB-Consent-Order.pdf (Consent Order between CFPB and American Express for “deceptive debt collection practices"); Consent Order, In re JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-138, (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Sept. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf (settling regulatory action by OCC for abusive debt collection); Mississippi v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., No. 3:2014cv00054 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 22, 2014).
192
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since then are largely responsible. When Caplovitz examined his
cases, confession of judgment was still possible in consumer cases.
In fact, Philadelphia cases were excluded from Caplovitz’s analysis of outcomes in court because those cases were all confessions
of judgment. 197 Default judgments were entered as a matter of
course and without judicial oversight when defendants failed to
appear or answer. 198 Today, entry of a default judgment is no
longer supposed to be a rubber-stamping exercise which occurs in
all cases of default.
While data about representation can be found in most of
the studies in Figure 11, only Bezdek discusses the impact of representation. She finds representation an unconvincing explanation for the disparity between the success of landlords and tenants. 199 The comparison is somewhat complicated because
landlords can be represented by non-lawyers, and these “landlords’ agents” are in fact professional representatives. 200 Only a
handful of tenants in Bezdek’s sample were assisted, three by
lawyers, six by friends or relatives. 201 All of them managed to
avoid an entirely negative outcome. 202 Bezdek sees this as a sign
that it may not be representation per se which improves the tenant’s outcome. 203 Unfortunately, informal assistance by nonlawyers was beyond the reach of this study, 204 so the importance
of brief advice and assistance compared to full legal representation remains fertile ground for further research.
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 23, at 192.
Id. at 201-03.
199
Bezdek, supra note 108, at 562-63.
200
MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-206(b) (West 2011) (providing that “a person . . . representing a landlord” need not be admitted to the Bar;
the same exception is conferred to those representing a tenant if the person is a
law student or employee of an organization funded by the Maryland Legal
Services Corporation).
201
Bezdek, supra note 108, at 562.
202
Id.
203
See id. at 563 (“The fact that the tenants who were assisted by nonlawyer friends or relatives achieved more success than the average tenant invites the speculation that qualities other than legal representation may account
for some tenants’ persistence in court. Qualities such as encouragement . . . and
assistance in presenting [the matter] oneself may account for a more successful
hearing. . . . Perhaps the significance of assistance to tenants . . . is chiefly the
breaking of [the rent court’s] rhythm [of landlord-plaintiff claims].”)
204
Such assistance could only be discovered by interviewing defendants,
and perhaps by observing hearings.
197
198
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Acknowledge That We Have a “Shadow System” for
Collections
An adversarial process overseen by a neutral judge is the
supposed hallmark of the American justice system. Each side has
a lawyer who is a zealous advocate, and a judge presides while a
judge or jury determines the facts, applies the law and decides an
outcome. Any cracks in the system are supposed to be filled by
public defenders, legal aid lawyers, court appointed lawyers, or
lawyers who are providing pro bono representation.
The reality is quite different. For consumer defendants in
collection cases, there is a “shadow system” which is characterized
by a lack of public awareness, a lack of formal rules, a lack of
understanding on the part of defendants, and a lack of legal representation. In short, our broken debt collection system is scarcely
recognizable to the uninitiated. Before we can move forward, we
need to fully accept the fact of just how far the system falls short
of traditional notions of due process.
B. Restore the Rules of Evidence to Ensure Due Process.
Due process concerns are implicated when courts do not
require that claims be proved by admissible evidence authenticated by someone with relevant personal knowledge about the
evidence being proffered. Debt buyer lawsuits have proliferated
because courts have not insisted on this, preferring to wield the
rubber stamp rather than engage in the more demanding job of
acting as guardians at the gates. Too often, debt buyers do not
have admissible evidence to prove that a consumer was ever liable to a bank or that the debt buyer has standing to sue, and do
not have reliable evidence to prove damages. Debt buyers often
do not have the proof because the banks either did not have it or
chose not to transfer it at the time the portfolios of debt were
sold. 205
The percentage of default judgments obtained by debt
buyers exists because judges have allowed relaxed and informal
Holland, supra note 37, at 272; Peter A. Holland, Defending Junk Debt
Buyer Lawsuits, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 12, 14 (2012).
205
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procedures—originally intended to streamline small-stakes cases
brought by self-represented litigants—to be used by some of
America’s most powerful financial services corporations, fully
lawyered up, against the very lawyer-less litigants whom small
claims procedures were supposed to protect.
C. Revisit the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The study of collections lawsuits is largely a study of what
happens in the absence of an adversarial system. Because civil litigants do not currently have a right to counsel, the question for
the profession becomes whether we are doing the right thing even
when nobody is looking. In light of the abundant documentation
of litigation abuses, and the knowing sale of junk debt by banks,
the legal profession as a whole needs to step up and fix the problems. The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
states that lawyers have “a special responsibility for the quality of
justice.” 206 This special duty is partially spelled out in the Model
Rules. One such rule is Model Rule 3.3, which prohibits lawyers
from knowingly making false statements of fact to a tribunal or
failing to correct false statements of fact to a tribunal.207
The Rule 3.3 problem arises because lawyers for debt buyers refuse or fail to advise the tribunal about the contents of the
Purchase and Sale Agreement between the bank and the debt
buyer, which often specifically disclaims any warranties (including warranties of title), and which in some cases state that the account balances are only “approximate.” 208 It is difficult not to
conclude that lawyers who represent to a tribunal that there is a
precise balance owing, when in fact the balance is only “approximate,” are engaging in a misrepresentation of material fact or a
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011).
Id. at R. 3.3.
208
See supra notes 15, 78 and accompanying text. See also Jeff Horwitz,
Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty Records, AM.
BANKER,
March
29,
2013,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_62/bofa-credit-cards-collectionsdebts-faulty-records-1047992-1.html (explaining that the sales contracts between banks and debt buyers often disclaim “‘any representations, warranties,
promises, covenants, agreements, or guarantees of any kind or character whatsoever’ about the accuracy or completeness of the debts’ records” resulting in
the sale of claims for balances which are only approximate, that may have already been paid in full or discharged in bankruptcy).
206
207
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failure to correct a previous misstatement of material fact. Comment 2 of Rule 3.3 states that the purpose of the Rule is “to avoid
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.” 209 Comment 7 to the Rule states that in general in a civil
case, “if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of the client’s deception to the court or to the
other party.” 210 Comment 7 goes on to state that if the Rule were
otherwise, “the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being
a party to a fraud on the court.” 211 Comment 13 to Rule 3.3 states
that “the advocate must disclose” cases of actual perjury by a client regarding a material fact. 212 It is difficult to discern how robosigned affidavits containing forged signatures, or which falsely
claim to be based on personal knowledge, do not constitute actual
perjury by a client, which are the subject of mandatory disclosure
by the client’s advocate.
Based on this author’s anecdotal experience, many debt
buyer attorneys report that they don’t receive the Purchase and
Sales Agreement as part of their file. This is not satisfactory, because to be competent, a lawyer must always investigate the relevant facts and law prior to filing a lawsuit. 213 As stated by one
court, in a collection case “where an attorney commences suit in
so uninformed a manner that he is ignorant even as to what law
governs his suit, it cannot be said that he has undertaken a level
of review sufficient to satisfy even the most general requirements
of attorney conduct . . . .” 214
It is understandable that as more and more secret Purchase and Sale Agreements become public, the faith of the courts
and the public continues to be shaken. In the context of robosigning directed by a foreclosure lawyer, Maryland’s highest
court recently stated that “even the slightest accommodation of
deceit or lack of candor in any material respect quickly erodes the
validity of the process.” 215 Once the procedural validity starts to
209
210
211
212
213
214

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.3 cmt. 2 (2011).
Id. at cmt. 7.
Id.
Id. at cmt. 13.
Id. at R 1.1.
Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 98 (E.D.N.Y.

2009).
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178 (Md.
2013) (quoting United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457 (4th
215
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erode, “the people are then justified in abandoning support for
the system in favor of one where honesty is preeminent.” 216 It is
up to the profession, in an act of self-governance, to restore a system in small claims courts “where honesty is preeminent.” Debt
buyers profit by filing vast numbers of suits that are at best unsubstantiated and at worst fraudulent. They do so with the cooperation of lawyers, who also profit from this behavior. The attitude that all of the known problems of proof in debt buyer cases
can be ignored unless a defense is mounted is no longer acceptable.
D. Revisit the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct needs to be updated
to reflect the modern reality of self-representation and of sophisticated lawyers running roughshod over self-represented litigants.
The Model Code requires impartiality and fairness in general but
does not specifically refer to self-represented litigants.217 The
Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct more clearly establishes the
power of judges to make reasonable accommodations to ensure
that self-represented litigants have the “the opportunity to have
their matters fairly heard.” 218 Comment 2 to Rule 2.6 in Maryland
talks about ensuring that self-represented litigants have the “right
to be heard.” 219
These rules assume that there is a self-represented litigant
who is participating and wants to “be heard.” But the problem
with debt buyer lawsuits—and with small claims in general—is
that the vast majority of defendants do not show up and ask to
“be heard.” The Rules need to be updated to give judges guidance
for appropriate conduct dealing with unrepresented parties in the
vast majority of cases where they do not appear in court. One test
of our system is what happens when both sides have excellent
lawyers who are zealous advocates. But an equal test, which impacts a far greater number of people, is what happens when one
side consistently does not have a lawyer (or does not even show
Cir. 1993)).
216
Id.
217
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2011).
218
MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.2.2 cmt. 4 (2010).
219
Id. at R.2.6 cmt. 2. Note, however, that no such comment exists in the
ABA Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.6 (2011).
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up), while the other does. How do we ensure a level playing field
amidst so great an imbalance of power? Judges need further
guidance in this area to ensure that our system can pass both
tests. To that end, the Model Code needs updating.
E. Revisit the Law School Curriculum.
When they first observe the shadow system, students and
practicing lawyers are surprised to discover that there are sometimes court rooms with no judges in them, trials with no witnesses, and hallways filled with lawyers presenting defendants with
settlements which are doomed to fail. The surprise comes not only from due process and equal protection concerns, but also from
the fact that “nobody ever told me about this” either in law school
or in law practice. The fact that it is unknown and not discussed
is precisely what makes it a “shadow system.”
While the philosophical debate over the proper balance
between theory and practice in law schools continues, access to a
lawyer becomes less and less obtainable for the majority of Americans in the majority of cases. 220 While lack of access to lawyers
has many causes, one cause is that students, professors, and even
most lawyers are totally unaware of the shadow system.
Law students should be exposed to the shadow system early in
their law school career. This requires only a few hours of direct
courtroom observation, which would not interfere with existing
course demands. There would be several immediate benefits to
the student, to the academy and to the profession. First, it would
break the myth of the adversary system that is assumed throughout law school. Second, it would immediately infuse first year
classes with real world issues of legal profession and procedure.
Third, it might serve as a deterrent to judicial rubber-stamping
and restore some balance to proceedings when judges know that
students are watching and reporting back. Fourth, it would inspire more future lawyers to think creatively about how to im220
See e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Foreword: Training Law Students for the
Future: On Train Wrecks, Leadership & Choices, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 297
(2009) (foreword to a symposium issue on “the ‘train wrecks’ that legal education may soon experience”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS
(2012); I. Richard Gershon, In Ten Years All New Law Schools, 44 U. TOLEDO
L. REV. 335 (2013) (suggesting that the creation and destruction of new law
schools will drive innovation).
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prove delivery of legal services to underrepresented client populations, either through pro bono, low bono, fee shifting, counterclaims, or class actions.
One of the reasons that appellate cases are valuable as
teaching tools is because the lawyers did such a great job in developing the facts and exploring the law. The fact that most people in this country today do not have and cannot afford a lawyer
is relevant to our understanding of how the law develops. For example, very few pro se plaintiffs can survive a Motion to Dismiss
in this post-Iqbal world we now live in.221 And even if they could,
it is impossible for most consumers to bring their disputes to
court, because of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence about
forced arbitration. 222 Early exposure to the shadow system would
demonstrate to students that the life of the law is neither logic nor
experience; it is both, and the constant struggle to establish the
proper balance should begin with students gaining early exposure
to the law as it exists for the vast majority of our citizens in the
vast majority of cases.
F. Adopt Simple, Common Sense Reforms
Just as Lord Coke predicted, the sale of causes of action
has created confusion and a multiplication in the number of lawsuits. 223 One of the goals of this paper is to spark debate on these
and other proposals for reform. Below is a partial list of some
common sense reforms.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao
of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 629 (2010) (noting that 85% of motions to dismiss on pleading grounds in
pro se cases were granted following Iqbal); c.f. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal
Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing
Discrimination, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011).
222
Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. U. L. REV.
87 (2012) (explaining the hurdles established by Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence); Beth Davis, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term
Care Contracts: How to Protect the Rights of Seniors in Washington, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213 (2011) (reporting how claims of elder abuse are suppressed by the use of arbitration clauses in long-term care facility contracts in
Washington state).
223
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
221
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1. Ban “as is” sales contracts and require full documentation.
If banks do not have the requisite proof to pursue the
claims in their own name, they should not be allowed to sell off
accounts with full knowledge that the purchaser will use the
courts to extract default judgments, despite the fact that there is
no adequate data to prove the debt. Arguably, if improvident
lending or irresponsible consumer behavior ultimately results in
default, then any discretionary lawsuit should be pursued by the
bank that was allegedly harmed, not by some unknown investor
in claims. But if debts are to be sold, they should be sold whole:
complete with all of the information that the bank would need if
it were suing in its own name. This requires proof of liability for
breach of contract and proof of contract damages. Such proof
would include the underlying contract, a running balance on the
account, and a breakdown of the principal amount of money borrowed, plus a separate itemization of all interest, all late fees, all
over limit fees, all add-on products, all maintenance fees, and any
other fees that were added to the principal amount. It is notable
that recovery of any fees or interest are limited to those bargained
for in the underlying contract, which is missing in almost every
debt buyer case.
Another option would be to limit any recovery to the
amount of the principal amount of the original extension of credit, and to specifically exclude from recovery all finance charges
such as interest, late fees and over-limit fees which cannot be
proved by a written contract.
2. Require full disclosure of un-redacted forward flow
agreements
The Purchase and Sale Contracts (also known as “Forward Flow Agreements”) between banks and debt buyers must
no longer remain secret. For all the cases that are currently in litigation in which the bundle of debt was sold “as is” with all faults,
and with explicit disclaimers of warranty, this fact needs to be
widely publicized to the defendants and to the courts. All debt
buyer lawsuits should contain a copy either the original Forward
Flow Agreement (at forty or more pages this may prove inconvenient) or a link to a website that hosts the specific forward flow
agreement which goes with each account. An easy example is the
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agreement between FIA Card Services, Inc. and CACH, LLC
which was highlighted by the American Banker for its explicit
disclaimers of warranty, including that the debt may not be
owed, may have been discharged in bankruptcy, may be the result of fraud, may not be supported by documentation, and that
the balance amount is only “approximate.” 224 Can lawyers, in
their role as “public citizens having a special obligation to ensure
the quality of justice” think of any possible justification for hiding
from the tribunal the fact that the bank disclosed at the time of
sale that the consumer may not be liable, and that even if liable,
that the stated amount of liability is only “approximate”?
3. Adopt statutes mandating reciprocal fee shifting in consumer
contract cases
Most consumer contracts for goods or services state that if
the creditor files a lawsuit, the consumer must pay all collections
costs and all of the creditor’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. Legislatures could adopt a statute that states simply that in a consumer
contract, if there is a provision for attorneys’ fees in the event
that the creditor prevails, the provision is reciprocal as a matter
of law. Many states have such a statute already. 225 Such a statute
incentivizes the private bar to step forth and provide a defense,
when a meritorious defense exists. This should have a deterrent
effect on the filing of cases that cannot be proven.
4. Provide same day lawyers in the courthouse
If the “adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments” is to survive, 226 we must ensure that legal help is available
to those who need it. Persuading defendants to represent themselves will always be difficult if they are forced to navigate a
strange and hostile system without sufficient advice or assistance
Horwitz, supra note 208; Loan Sale Agreement, supra note 45.
Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney’s Fees Clauses: A Proposal to
Shift to the Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 86, 114-120 (2012) (noting the different approaches taken by state statutes which require fee-shifting reciprocity).
226
The strength of the adversarial tradition is such that “our entire dispute resolution system depends on the integrity of the participants, who seek
the truth through an adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 178 (Md. 2013).
224
225
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from the legal profession. Even if defendants can be convinced to
participate in the lawsuits, they will not receive justice without
legal help. The defendants in this study who did file a response to
the lawsuit (presumably the most committed defendants) fared
much worse than those who had a lawyer. At a minimum, consumers sued in collection courts should be able to get some legal
advice before they enter what has become the lion’s den. To this
end, courthouse projects staffed by volunteer or legal services attorneys have proven highly successful in delivering limited unbundled legal advice. 227 While this “half a loaf” approach is not
ideal, it does provide limited ammunition to the astute few selfrepresented litigants who aspire to a fair fight in court. Further,
because the evidence in debt buyer cases is inherently shoddy (as
evidenced in the “as is” Forward Flow Agreements) these trials
should be easy for a self-represented litigant to win, with a little
bit of help and coaching from a lawyer.

CONCLUSION
This article has provided a window into the opaque world
of consumer defaults in debt buyer law suits. Forty years ago,
David Caplovitz described the economic condition of consumers
who defaulted on their debts to the businesses that had extended
them credit. Much of what he observed applies equally to today’s
defendants in debt buyer lawsuits. Like their counterparts from
forty years ago, today’s defendants lack adequate health insurance, 228 lack a safety net sufficiently broad to prevent the traumatic financial consequences of sickness or unemployment, 229 and
lack the tools to avoid financial scams. 230
Maria Aspan, supra note 55 (noting the work of the ProBono Resource
Center of Maryland).
228
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2001);
Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the
Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001).
229
Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, Global Lessons from Consumer Bankruptcy and Healthcare Reforms in the United States: A Struggling
Social Safety Net, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 343 (2007).
230
Contemporary concern focuses on payday loans. See, e.g., Marcie Geffner, Payday loans ‘unaffordable’, BANKRATE.COM BANKING BLOG (Feb. 22,
2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/payday-loans227
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The bench, the bar and the academy each have a role to
play in shining the light onto the shadow system, thereby paving
the way to much needed reforms.

unaffordable/ (reporting the findings of the Pew Charitable Trust); PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY
LOANS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Sma
ll_Dollar_Loans/Pew_Choosing_Borrowing_Payday_Feb2013.pdf; Gretchen
Morgenson, Find the Loan Behind the Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/business/find-the-loan-behind-theloans.html?_r=0 (noting recent pressure by state regulators on online, payday
lenders).
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APPENDIX A: FULL PROTOCOL OF STUDY
I assigned the gathering of data relating to certain debt
buyers and years to clinic students, who then entered the data into a pre-formatted Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Some students
gathered data on a single debt buyer in a single year, while others
gathered multiple debt buyers and years. For example, an individual student was responsible for gathering data regarding 200
lawsuits filed in the District Court by Midland Funding, LLC
during the 2009 calendar year. Under this system each student
gathered between 200 and 800 records. Any questions regarding
the study’s protocol were addressed as they arose.
Data were gathered from Maryland Judiciary Case Search
(“Case Search”), which is a searchable online database containing
the actual court dockets. Case Search can be searched in a number of ways: by case number, filing date, jurisdiction and party
names. Pursuant to the written protocol, students gathered data
by searching for the named debt buyers appearing as plaintiffs in
civil cases in the District Court of Maryland. 231 Without any parameters for dates, Case Search will display a maximum of 500
search results for any given search. Because many debt buyers
filed large numbers of cases, it was necessary to limit each search
to a specific month or even a specific day. 232 Using a random
number generator, a case was then randomly selected from the

Using Case Search to search for party names is problematic: Case
Search will only detect literal matches for part or all of a party name. Searching for the proper legal name of a debt buyer would often miss many cases
filed by that debt buyer. For example, “Pasadena Receivables, Inc.” will often
appear in court records without the comma or period, without “Inc” or with
simple spelling errors such as reversing the “i” and the “e” in “Receivables”. To
address this problem, the first word of the plaintiff’s name was used in the
search criteria. For example, for “Pasadena Receivables, Inc.” the search term
was “Pasadena”. Any search results unrelated to the debt buyer were ignored.
Because the name of each debt buyer was rather unique, the number of unrelated search results were minimal and statistically insignificant.
232
First, students were instructed to select a random month, by requesting
a random number between 1 and 12 from http://www.random.org. The student
would then enter a data range in case search covering that month. For example, April 1st, 2009 to April 30th, 2009. If this search produced more than 500
results, the student would request a new random number between 1 and the
number of days in the selected month, and then conduct the search again for
the day selected.
231
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cases filed in the District Court in that month or on that day. 233
The student would copy the specified data from the record on
Case Search. 234
After the data were gathered, quality control checks were
performed and, as discussed below in detail, any outliers were
removed. First, some aberrant cases were removed and replaced:
duplicates of cases which despite randomization, were sampled
more than once, cases which were transferred to another jurisdiction, 235 which simply recorded the entry of a foreign judgment, 236
where the complaint amount was zero or where the principal
amount of the judgment was greater than the complaint
amount. 237 Second, the consistency of spelling was checked to en-

Again, the randomization was performed using http://www.random.org.
The data were: Case Number, Plaintiff, Court, Filing Date, Case Status (Active, Closed or Bankruptcy), Complaint Amount, Judgment Type (Affidavit Judgment, Consent Judgment for P, Consent Judgment for D, Default
Judgment for P, Default Judgment for D, Trial Judgment for D, Trial Judgment for P, 3-506(B) Dismissal upon Stipulated Terms, Rule 3-506 Dismissal,
Rule 3-507 Dismissal, Complaint Dismissed by Court) (this category was left
blank if no judgment/dismissal had been entered in a given case), Judgment
Amount (this category was left blank unless a judgment against D was entered), Judgment Interest (this category was left blank unless a judgment
against D was entered), Attorney Fees (this category was left blank unless a
judgment against D was entered), Court Costs (this category was left blank unless a judgment against D was entered), Other Amounts (this category was left
blank unless a judgment against D was entered), Total Judgment (Judgment
Amount + Judgment Interest + Attorney Fees + Court Costs + Other
Amounts), Whether post judgment interest at the legal rate was awarded,
Whether the Defendant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend, Whether the Defendant had an Attorney, Defendant’s address, Defendants zip code, Plaintiff’s
Attorney, Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Firm.
In all cases the case number was preceded by an asterisk, to prevent the
spreadsheet software from truncating case numbers that began with a zero. All
amounts were entered as simple numbers. All yes or no data were recorded as
their “Yes” or “No”.
235
These were removed because the case record did not cover the whole
course of the case.
236
Id.
237
These two categories were removed because they seemed to indicate
substantial errors in the data recorded on Case Search which would harm the
accuracy of the results in general. Note that cases were only removed if the
judgment amount (i.e. the amount of the complaint for which plaintiff obtained judgment), not the total judgment, was greater than the complaint. The
former indicates an error, while the latter is caused by the addition of costs, interest and attorneys’ fees.
233
234
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sure that data could be properly analyzed automatically. 238 Third,
one particular judgment type was rechecked: dismissals under
Rule 3-506. There appeared to have been some confusion among
students that led to some Rule 3-506(b) dismissals being wrongly
recorded as Rule 3-506 dismissals. All cases with the Rule 3-506
judgment type were re-checked by a teaching assistant and any
errors in judgment type were corrected.
Finally, 10% of the sampled cases were re-checked against
Case Search for errors. A total of fifty-one errors or omissions
were detected. The errors were not material, relating to defendants’ addresses or plaintiff’s attorneys or firms. All of these errors
were corrected before subsequent analysis.
The last step before analysis of the data was to check the
quantitative data for outliers. The quantitative variables are
“Complaint Amount,” “Judgment Amount,” “Interest,” “Costs,”
“Other Amounts,” “Atty Fees,” and “Total Judgment.” Each category had many data points beyond two deviations of the mean
and even three deviations of the mean. For example, in “Complaint Amount,” 0.023% of data fell outside two standard deviations of the mean, and 0.009% of data fell outside three standard
deviations. Scatterplots revealed that many of the quantitative
variables were generally normally distributed.
Rather than arbitrarily remove data outside of two or
three standard deviations, only a couple of very extreme data
points were removed (all other data generally behaving normally)
to provide the most robust presentation of data. The only data
outliers removed were a complaint amount of $252,260 (approximately 48 standard deviations greater than the mean), and a costs
datum of $650 (approximately 30 standard deviations greater
than the mean). These data were very likely the result of typographical recording errors in Case Search itself.
The complaint amount outlier was not a case that resulted
in judgment against the defendant; therefore, none of the judgment related variables were impacted. The average complaint
amount with this outlier included was $3.050.38 with a standard
deviation of $5,149.06. Removing this outlier decreased the average complaint amount to $2,993.73 with a standard deviation of
238
Zip codes were also limited to five digits, and any quantitative data
which had been entered as currency were changed to a simple number to aid
computer analysis.
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$3,520.56.
The costs outlier was removed and the mean for costs
without this outlier was imputed in its place. Imputation was
necessary because completely removing this datum would have
provided a less precise measurement of the average total judgment category, which includes costs.

